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This paper evaluates bank exit regimes in selected financial centres using
econometric methods. The focus is on bank exit regimes applicable to commercial
banks in New York, London, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Tokyo in 1998–2002. Bank
exit regimes are studied from the perspective of bank creditors and bank
shareholders. In order to apply econometric methods, the exit regimes are indexed
and then evaluated by comparing them with market indicators that reflect the
interests of bank creditors and shareholders. These market indicators comprise
bank refinancing costs and bank growth rates. In other words, two specific
questions are addressed: (1) Do differences in bank exit regimes of significance to
bank creditors explain differences in bank refinancing costs? (2) Do differences in
bank exit regimes significant to bank shareholders explain differences in bank
growth? The study shows that in those financial centres where the probability of
bailout is higher, refinancing costs for banks are lower.
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Arviointitutkimus Yhdysvaltain, Euroopan ja Japanin
pankkien uudelleenjärjestely- ja
likvidaatiolainsäädännöstä ja -käytännöistä




Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan pankkien uudelleenjärjestely- ja likvidaatiolakeja
ja -käytäntöjä maailman eri rahoituskeskuksissa. Arvioinnissa sovelletaan talous-
tieteellisiä menetelmiä. Arvioinnin kohteena ovat New Yorkin, Lontoon, Frank-
furtin, Helsingin ja Tokion rahoituskeskusten liikepankkeja koskevat lait ja käy-
tännöt vuosilta 1998–2002. Lakeja ja käytäntöjä tarkastellaan pankkien velkojien
ja osakkeenomistajien näkökulmasta. Taloustieteellisten menetelmien soveltami-
seksi lait ja käytännöt indeksoidaan ja niitä vertaillaan pankkien velkojien ja
osakkeenomistajien intressejä kuvaavien markkina-indikaattoreiden havaittuihin
arvoihin. Näitä markkina-indikaattoreita ovat pankkien jälleenrahoituskustannus
ja kasvuvauhti. Tutkimuksessa vastataan kysymyksiin vaikuttavatko pankkien vel-
kojia koskevien lakisäännösten ja käytäntöjen erot pankkien jälleenrahoitus-
kustannuksiin ja vaikuttavatko pankkien osakkeenomistajia koskevien laki-
säännösten ja käytäntöjen erot pankkien kasvuvauhtiin. Tutkimus osoittaa, että
niissä rahoituskeskuksissa, joissa pankkituen mahdollisuus on suurempi, pankkien
jälleenrahoituskustannukset ovat pienemmät.
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The topic of this paper is ”Economic evaluation of bank exit regimes in US, EU
and Japanese financial centres”. Pursuant to the topic, bank exit regimes
(reorganisation and liquidation rules and practices for banks) in five of the world’s
financial centres are assessed. The financial centres concerned include New York
(USA), London (UK/EU), Frankfurt (Germany/EU), Helsinki (Finland/EU) and
Tokyo (Japan). The evaluation focuses on the competitiveness of financial
centres. In other words, bank exit regimes are evaluated in terms of their effects
on the competition between the centres. Increasing global competition indicates
competition also between world financial centres. In the evaluation, legislation
evaluation methodology is used. Legislation evaluation methodology provides for
a variety of approaches in order to estimate the effects of certain legislation and
assess the legislation (according to a chosen set of values). As for a detailed legal
description of the bank exit regimes concerned, the reader is referred to Granlund
2002.
1
This paper links to previous research made on financial centre
competitiveness. In this research, the focus has mostly been on the determinants
of financial centre growth measured as the number of foreign banks attracted.
Foreign banks have been considered to engage in new markets by establishing
bank subsidiaries, bank branches and other financial institutions. By restricting the
perspective on financial centre competitiveness to foreign bank-engagements, a
certain level of sensitivity has been introduced in the analyses made. Since foreign
banks (ie international capital resources) are seen as well informed and sensitive
in their choice of location, their decision and actions have been considered as the
best available attribute for rational behaviour.
2 In theoretical discussions on
determinants for the location of foreign bank engagements, a categorisation of
determinants into profit-oriented, advantage-focused and structural may be
identified. Profit-oriented determinants of foreign bank-engagements deal with the
traditional questions of company profitability. The probability of receiving new
customers from the financial centre or the need for a bank to be close to its
customers as a condition for future success relate to this group of determinants.
Advantage-focused determinants concentrate on bilateral aspects between the
home country of the foreign bank and the financial centre in question. Similarly,
                                                
1 Granlund 2002 “Bank exit legislation in US, EU and Japanese financial centres” Bank of Finland
DP 25/2002.
2 Examples of studies focusing on foreign bank engagements as an attribute for financial centre
competitiveness include Jeger, Haegler and Theiss 1992 “On the attractiveness of Financial
Centers” and Brealey and Kaplanis 1996 “The Determination of Foreign Banking Location”.
Kindleberger 1974 “The Formation of Financial Centres: A Study in Comparative Economic
History” may be considered as a prime source in the debate on financial centre competitiveness.8
they may relate to the fact that the bank may be apt to follow non-bank companies
from the bank’s home country engaging in trade in the financial centre. Finally,
the theoretical debate also comprises structural determinants. Structural
determinants are legal and governmental determinants affecting the foreign bank’s
decision where to engage. Taxes or reserve requirements are examples of this
group of determinants. Looking at the empirical results of analyses made on
determinants of bank engagement, most groups of determinants are represented by
significant results. Eg local economy size, stock-market turnover, bilateral trade
flow, foreign direct investment and the level of banking secrecy have been shown
to correlate with the number of foreign banks established.
3
More specifically, this paper links to the research made on the effects of
structural determinants on financial centre competitiveness. In the paper, the five
bank exit regimes are evaluated in terms of their implications on financial centre
competitiveness. In practice, the bank exit regimes are evaluated by carrying out
two separate analyses. In the first analysis, the effects of the bank exit regimes on
the refinancing cost for banks are investigated by looking into the question: “Do
differences in bank exit regimes of significance to bank creditors provide for
differences in bank refinancing costs?”. In the second analysis, another dimension
of financial centre competitiveness is focused on. In this analysis, the effects of
bank exit regimes on bank growth are dealt with. The question addressed here is:
“Does variation in bank exit regimes significant to bank shareholders provide for
differences in bank growth?”. In both analyses, the question concerning financial
centre competitiveness is transformed to a question involving bank stakeholders.
This is done in order to create conditions for the application of the legislation
evaluation methodology on empirical market conditions (ie identify relevant law
provisions and select market attributes as indicators of legal effects).
Regarding the structure of the paper, chapter 2 presents various
methodological approaches for the economic evaluation of legislation. As a result
of the fact that the empirical analyses in this paper are comparative (ie covers and
compares bank exit regimes in several financial centres), methods for comparative
legislation evaluation are listed. Motives for the choice of method in this study are
also presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 concentrates on how the bank exit regimes,
ie bank exit legislation and practice, are specified and quantified. This is done in
order to enable the application of econometric methods. In the first sub-chapter,
the rules and practices relevant to bank creditors are specified and quantified. In
the second sub-chapter, rules and practices relevant to bank shareholders are
concentrated on. In chapter 4, market attributes (indicators of eventual legal
                                                
3 For empirical findings on conditions for financial centre growth see also Goldberg, Helsley and
Levi 1989 “The Prerequisites for an International Financial Centre”. Recently, Bebchuk and
Cohen 2002 have provided evidence on the role of state-level take-over protection as a
determinant of firm location in the US.9
effects) are selected, principles for the collection of data presented and
calculations made. When analysing the effects of features of the bank exit regimes
relevant to bank creditors on bank refinancing costs, the market attribute selected
is the refinancing spread on publicly traded bank bonds. The spread is defined as
the difference between the bank bond yield and a risk-free rate of return
(government bond) of equal maturity. When investigating the effects of features
of the bank exit regimes relevant to bank shareholders on bank growth, the market
attribute chosen is the change in bank balance sheet end sums. In chapter 5 and 6
results are interpreted and conclusions drawn. Interpretation is made in the light of
existing theories and empirical findings on spreads and bank growth. Finally,
implications of the results on financial centre competitiveness are considered.
2 Formulating the research problems
2.1 The main features of legislation evaluation
methodology
In principle, there are several methodological paths to follow when evaluating
bank exit legislation in various financial centres. To receive a picture of these
alternative paths, the logical fundamentals of the evaluation research problem, the
character of the empirical reality to which methods will be applied and the
variety of available methods should be addressed. Furthermore, it is apparent that
these dimensions are partly interdependent. Eg data availability may affect the
view on potential methods. In order to analyse the dimensions mentioned, each of
the dimensions is discussed separately below.
4
Starting with the logical fundamentals of the evaluation research problem,
this dimension comprises a number of sub-dimensions that have to be dealt with
in order to proceed with the evaluation. To sum up, the areas that require further
attention relate to a) the fact whether the evaluation focuses on one legal entity or
several, b) the identification of values for the evaluation, c) the type of organising
principle intended for the evaluation and d) the specification of the diachronic
character of the study. – As for the question whether the focus is on one legal
entity or several, this corresponds with an analytically “simple” or a comparative
approach. In analytically “simple” approaches, one law or one set of law
                                                
4 Originally, the question of applying quantitative techniques in the form of experiments to the
evaluation of law was considered in Lempert 1966 “Strategies of Research Design in the Legal
Impact Study: the Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses”. The role of regression techniques in
legal contexts was initially analysed in Fisher 1980 “Multiple Regressions in Legal Proceedings”.
The tradition of Law & Economics has also partly dealt with the evaluation of laws on a case-base.10
provisions is evaluated. In comparative approaches, several laws or sets of laws
are compared and evaluated. Usually, comparative approaches indicate that
resembling laws in various countries are compared and evaluated. Because a) the
evaluation research procedure partly differs in the case of “simple” versus
comparative approaches and b) the evaluation approach applied to the bank exit
regimes in this paper is comparative, comparative approaches are separately
looked into in more detail below. – Another sub-dimension of the logical
fundamentals of the evaluation research problem is the identification of values for
the evaluation. Often, one thinks of values in evaluation research as the values to
be used in the assessment of the chosen legislation. But in theory, evaluation
research also deals with the question concerning what values the law originally
represents. If the legislation is evaluated in relation to the original aims (ie values)
of the law, the evaluation is said to be goal-oriented. If the values used for
evaluation are found elsewhere, the evaluation is characterised as value-rational.
The first (ie goal-oriented) approach is the traditional one. Also, values have a
major impact on how the legislation evaluation is carried out in detail. To sum up,
values not only represent a) a yardstick for the value assessment of the law. They
also constitute b) a formula for the identification of relevant law provisions, c) an
indication of the areas where effects of the law should be searched for and to
some extent d) affect assumptions concerning the causal relations between the law
and its effects.
5
The next entity relating to the logical fundamentals of the evaluation research
problem deals with the type of organising principle intended for the evaluation.
Most commonly, legislation evaluations are analyses of the effects of the
legislation. But evaluations may also compare legal effects with the formal or
informal goals attached to the legislation. Moreover, efficiency issues are
common in evaluations, introducing benefits and costs as parts of the analyses.
Some evaluations also classify as input analyses, focusing on the input (of any
type) needed in order to reach specific legal effects. In other cases, legislation
evaluations may concentrate on causes or processes leading to a certain outcome.
– Finally, the time dimension, ie the specification of the diachronic character of
the evaluation, is a matter that links to the logical fundamentals of the study.
Legislation evaluation studies have been categorised according to the time when
the study has been carried out and the time when the law has been introduced. Ex
ante-analyses have dealt with anticipated effects of planned legislation, while ex
post-analyses have focused on the time after the introduction of the law and,
eventually, identifiable legal effects.
6
                                                
5 Concerning the role of values in evaluation research see Shadish, Cook and Leviton 1991.
6 Worth remembering is that in legislation evaluation research the time period for legal effects to
emerge may strongly vary. This fact should not be mixed up with the question whether the
scientific means are sufficient to detect effects of the law.11
Another dimension to consider in evaluation research concerns the character
of the empirical reality to which the legislation evaluation methods will be
applied. In legislation evaluation two specific problems arise relating to the
character of the empirical reality. First, it is apparent that particular methods are
better suited than others in evaluating certain types of law provisions. Second,
since legislation not only aims to change human behaviour but also human
attitudes, there is often a need for evaluation methods to detect attitude changes.
This may restrict the number of potential methods.
When it comes to the choice of legislation evaluation method, a variety of
alternatives are possible. In order to describe the methods in a significant way, the
perspective is restricted to one feature of the methods. This feature relates to the
causal relation between the law and its effects. In other words, the feature
concerns the identification of the net effects of legislation. To identify the net
effects of legislation, existing arsenals provide for experimental approaches
implemented through correlation-based methods, regressions and time series-
analyses. – Initially, experimental approaches have been applied to estimate the
net outcome of regulations. Depending on the amount of experimental elements
introduced into the approaches, researchers have distinguished between pre-
experimental, quasi-experimental and experimental methods. The idea in these
types of applications has been to compare real or hypothetical situational or
sequential descriptions of reality. In ex post evaluations, the identifiable reality
has been compared with hypothetical or real, contra-factual (ie without
legislation) reference-situations or -sequences. By comparing the descriptions,
assumptions or conclusions on the effects of legislation have been made using
correlation-based methods. The fact that the contra-factual descriptions of reality
often have been chosen from neighbouring areas has resulted in the use of the
term cross-sectional for many of these approaches.
7
In some cases, when the legislation evaluation studies have involved contra-
factual descriptions of reality, panel data (ie data with a time dimension) and
frequently changing legislation over time, conditions for correlation-based
approaches in the form of regression analyses have improved. Still, regression
techniques have mostly been used in comparative legislation evaluation involving
several jurisdictions (cross-sections). – The final potential method for the
identification of the net effects of legislation applied is time series analysis. The
starting point for this type of approach is the existence and discovery of trends. In
                                                
7 Originally, Campbell and Stanley 1966 discussed the logic and alternatives for experimental
designs in general evaluation research. Questions considered were primarily linked to the
construction of contra-factual reference situations or -sequences and the criteria that should be met
in order to draw conclusions about effects and generalise the results to similar cases. For a separate
presentation of existing correlation-based approaches to compare situations and sequences see
Tacq 1997.12
time series analysis the cross sectional element is eliminated. This means that the
scope of the analysis does not change over time. In legislation evaluation research
this fact has indicated that both the sequence before and after the introduction of
the law are covered for a given area. Time series analyses as a distinct type of
legislation evaluation research have been fairly rare. This derives from the fact
that the introduction of a law is usually a one-time event in the sequence of the
analysis. This implies that the conditions for tracking trend-associated changes are
not optimal.
8
2.2 Principles and methods for comparative legislation
evaluation
As a result of the fact that the evaluation of bank exit regimes in various financial
centres represents a comparative approach, a number of viewpoints on principles
and methods for comparative legislation evaluation (ie evaluation of two or more
jurisdictions) are presented below. Overall, a comparative approach has
significant implications for the structuring of the evaluation. In comparative
evaluation studies, the effects of the various laws should first be identified. Then,
the effects of the laws should be compared against prevalent value criteria. In
relation to “simple” evaluative research, the comparative approach generates
differences mainly in terms of the logical fundamentals of the evaluation research
problem and the final choice of evaluation method. More specifically, a)  the
development of consistent value criteria for comparative assessment of the laws
and their effects and b) the applicability of certain evaluation methods are the
areas most affected by the comparative approach.
To start, the development of consistent value criteria in comparative
approaches faces the same possibilities and problems as the value criteria used in
“simple” value-based assessments of any legislation. The roles of the value
criteria are the same. Value-criteria are used in order to assess the laws and their
effects, ie decide if laws are good or not. – In comparative legislation evaluation,
problems rise through the fact that various national laws seldom have identical
goals. This fact has had particular implications for goal-oriented evaluation (ie
assessing the laws and their effects by using the formal or informal goals of the
laws). In order to deal with the problem, some alternatives have been introduced.
Usually, this has meant that the value-criteria for the comparative assessment of
the laws have been an average (a compromise) of the goals of the various laws
evaluated. Sometimes, it has also meant that the goals of the laws of the
                                                
8 For ideas on principles to solve the problem of causation in legal contexts see Hage and Meeker
1988.13
researcher’s home country have been used as the value-criteria for the assessment
of all laws.
9
Concentrating on the applicability of certain evaluation methods, the
effects of the comparative character of the study differ depending on the method
in question. In experimental approaches the comparative character improves the
possibilities to construct the contra-factual reference-situation or -sequence. The
contra-factual reference may be derived from the other jurisdictions.
Alternatively, the existence of similar legislation in other countries provides data
in order to check for weaknesses in the contra-factual reference chosen. – The
comparative quality of the study may also improve the quality of conclusions
drawn from time series analysis. Eg the estimation of effects of certain historical
factors in traditional time series analysis results may be difficult. By combining
time series analyses of similar laws in various countries, this historical uncertainty
may be abolished. – In regression analyses, the search is for correlation between
features of the law and features of those areas where effects of the law ought to be
found. If correlation is found, the existence of causal relations between the law
and market conditions is probable. The conditions for applying regression
techniques on the data are a sufficient number of observations concerning both the
independent variable (ie the legislation) and the dependent variable (ie the market
conditions under the law). Moreover, the observations should vary over time and
cross-section (ie between countries). For the application of regression techniques,
the consequences of the comparative approach are significant. First, the
comparative approach (especially if several countries are involved) introduces a
sufficient number of cross-sections into the analysis. Second, by allowing for a
time dimension in the analysis, a second level of variation is introduced for the
observations (concerning both independent and dependent variables), further
improving the conditions for the application of regression techniques.
10
                                                
9 In value-rational comparative evaluation, values applied in the value-based assessment of the
laws and their effects are found elsewhere. In other words, value-rational assessment of laws uses
values other than the goals of the laws. Consequently, the fact that goals of various national laws
evaluated may differ, is not as large a problem.
10 The most recent evaluative research on capital market legislation using regression techniques is
the analyses carried out by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998 and 1999.
In the research, various national jurisdictions are evaluated by comparing legal determinants (ie
features of the jurisdictions) with concrete capital market conditions.14
2.3 Specifying the research problems and the research
procedures for this study
Final initial questions concern the specification of research problems, the choice
of methods and the formulation of detailed research procedures for this study. As
mentioned earlier, the aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate bank exit
regimes in some of the world’s financial centres. The evaluation is done in order
to receive a picture of the effects of laws on the competitiveness between financial
centres. Bank exit is defined in a broad manner including reorganisation and
liquidation of banks both according to the legislation and practices applied. The
bank exit legislation of the various financial centres has been previously presented
in Granlund 2002. In this second paper, various bank exit regimes are evaluated
and compared using legislation evaluation methodology. – Regarding the
specification of the research problems, the question concerning effects of bank
exit regimes on financial centre competitiveness is transformed to a question
concerning bank stakeholders. In other words, a bank stakeholder perspective is
used in the analysis. In sum, there are four reasons for selecting this approach.
Firstly, the focus on bank stakeholders derives from the fact that financial centre
competitiveness is a question about attractiveness, which in turn directs individual
stakeholder behaviour. Secondly, such an approach defines the values for the
legislation evaluation, since the laws and their effects are easily evaluated
according to the values (perspectives) of the stakeholders. Thirdly, by focusing on
stakeholders, the approach also creates conditions for the specification of relevant
law provisions, ie provisions with implications on a particular category of bank
stakeholders. Fourthly, applying a stakeholder perspective in the analysis also
directs and simplifies the choice of market features as attributes for legal effects,
since legal effects often constitute stakeholder behaviour.
Furthermore, relating to the specification of the research problems, the bank
exit regimes are evaluated by focusing on two different sub-problems. The first
sub-problem addressed may be formulated as the question: “Do differences in
bank exit regimes of significance for bank creditors provide for differences in
bank refinancing costs?” while the second sub-problem receives the form “Does
variation in bank exit regimes significant to bank shareholders provide for
differences in bank growth?”. The sub-problems may be further concretised by
specifying the type of bank exit provisions and practices evaluated. In this respect,
attention is given to those aspects of the bank exit regimes that matter in an
economic sense. In other words, provisions and practices dealt with concern the
level of security (financial assistance to banks) that the regimes provide bank
stakeholders. In addition, provisions focused on concern the amount (or lack) of
powers (right to commence bankruptcy, risk for capital loss in bank reorganisation
etc.) that the legislation provides bank stakeholders. Also, a specification of the15
sub-problems requires a definition of the market attributes (areas of eventual legal
effects) analysed. In the case of bank refinancing costs, refinancing spreads (the
difference between the rate of bank bonds and the risk-free rate) of banks in
various financial centres is looked into. In the case of bank growth, changes in
bank balance sheet end sums for banks in various financial centres are
investigated.
11
Finally, a few words may be said about the research procedure applied in
this analysis. The legislation evaluation method chosen in both sub-analyses is
regression analysis. The search is for correlation between characteristics of the
bank exit regimes and the market attributes (ie spreads or changes in balance sheet
end sums) in the various financial centres. If correlation exists, the existence of
causal relations between the bank exit regimes and the market attributes is
probable. This means that the bank exit regimes affect actual market conditions
and financial centre competitiveness to the extent investigated. – Conditions for
the application of regression techniques stem from the comparative character of
the study. The fact that bank exit regimes and market attributes (ie spreads and
changes in balance sheet end sums) are analysed for five financial centres (cross-
sections) contributes to the application of regression techniques. Similarly, the
time dimension (enabling the consideration of changes in the law over time and
creating a panel data set) further improves the conditions for regressions. As a
result of the number of cross-sections and the time-dimension, the number of
observations is sufficient in order to carry out the regressions.
12
                                                
11 Regarding the time dimension in the analysis, this partly varies due to which sub-problem is
considered. As for the first sub-problem involving bank creditors, data on changes of the bank exit
regimes in the financial centres and levels of bank spreads are collected for the years 1999–2002.
Discussing the second sub-problem concerning bank shareholders, this analysis covers the years
1998–2002.
12 The groundwork for the application of the regressions is done in sections 3.1–3.2 (specification
and quantification of bank exit regimes) and 4.1. (collection of data on attributes for prevailing
market conditions). The results of the calculations are presented in section 4.2.16
3 Definition and quantification of relevant features
of bank exit regimes
3.1 Specification and quantification of bank exit regimes
according to bank creditor interests
3.1.1 The Financial Assistance Index (FAI) as an attribute for
assistance probability
The aim of this section (3.1) is to specify and quantify the bank exit regimes to the
extent these concern bank creditors. The focus is on those aspects of the regimes
that matter to bank creditors in an economic sense. Aspects of this kind relate to
a) the degree of security that the regimes provide the creditors’ investments and
b) the amount of powers that the bank exit provisions transfer to bank creditors in
the reorganisation and liquidation of banks. In other words, the aspects of the
bank exit regimes looked into, mainly deal with features related to eventual
creditor capital loss. In addition, also other aspects of the bank exit regimes affect
creditor security and rights. These aspects may also have implications on market
conditions similar to the aspects analysed. In the following sections, correlation
between the specified aspects of the bank exit regimes and market conditions is
searched for. Since the bank exit regimes of five financial centres are covered
over time in the analyses, it is improbable that other aspects of the regimes would
correlate with the aspects specified.
In order to specify and quantify bank exit regimes to the extent these concern
bank creditors, two types of indexes are introduced. In the formulation of the
indexes, it is first specified which characteristics of the bank exit regimes are
included in the indexes. These characteristics do not change over time, ie the
format of the indexes are stable. In addition, the indexes receive grades according
to the level of the chosen characteristics for each financial centre. Since bank exit
regimes vary, bank exit regimes of the various financial centres will receive
deviating grades. In the case bank exit regimes are reformed, the financial centre
in question will receive new grades for the reformed regime. The regimes are
graded by giving each index a number between 15 and 0. Number 15 corresponds
with a high degree of security for creditor investments or large transfers of powers
to creditors. Number 0 corresponds with no security or power-transfer. – The first
index introduced is the Financial Assistance Index (FAI). FAI deals with the
overall probability of banks receiving financial assistance in various financial
centres. The second index created is the Bank-Creditor Rights Index (BCRI).17
BCRI focuses on certain basic creditor rights in the reorganisation and liquidation
of banks.
13
Analysing the Financial Assistance Index (FAI) further, two main questions
may be addressed. To begin with, the question concerning the format (ie the
specified content) of the FAI is analysed. Then, the separate grades that the
various financial centres receive according to the FAI are listed. – Regarding the
format of the FAI, this index concentrates on the probability of banks receiving
financial assistance. Comparing the various bank exit regimes, it is apparent that
substantial differences exist between the regimes. To receive a picture of the
differences between the regimes, the differences should be estimated in a number
of theoretical dimensions. First, one dimension should differentiate between the
legal bases for financial assistance and the assistance practice applied. In many
centres, the legal bases may be very specified, while in other centres legal bases
may be imprecise. The assistance practice of the financial centres also differs
strongly. Practice directs financial assistance to problem banks pursuant to the
varying principles set out by the bank exit legislation. Second, when considering
bank exit regimes, conditions for assistance should be separately looked into. On
this point, variation between legal conditions and actual practices may exist.
Sometimes, practice is more restricted than the discretionary principles set out by
the law. In other cases, one may be of the opinion that practice is more liberal than
the law originally intended.
14
Third, the form of assistance is another central feature when quantifying bank
exit regimes of various financial centres according to bank stakeholder
perspectives. In theory, the form of the assistance directs which bank stakeholders
will benefit from the assistance. According to this view, financial assistance
benefiting bank creditors should be in the form of subordinated debt or other low-
priority assistance (eg contributions). Financial assistance in the form of ordinary
(or prior) debt may of course create conditions for the redevelopment of the bank,
but also establishes a claim against the debtor’s assets of the same (or better)
priority as any creditor claim, deteriorating the position of former creditors. Still,
practice has shown that this aspect of assistance is not the most important one
when estimating the effects of eventual financial assistance on market behaviour.
                                                
13 La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny 1997 introduced various approaches for the
specification and quantification of legal regimes. First, the application of traditional nominal (0–1)
scales was considered in the article. This approach was motivated on the ground that the law either
does or does not regulate certain features. Second, simple cardinal scales relating to a certain legal
feature were used (assuming grade differences between countries exist). Finally, cardinal scales,
based on aggregate nominal series were considered. The format of these cardinal scales, ie
depending on what legal features were focused on in the aggregate nominal series, corresponded
with independent indexes.
14 For a presentation of the legal bases for financial assistance to banks and to a part the assistant
practice followed in the various financial centres see Granlund 2002.18
Consequently, the format of FAI mainly focuses on the overall probability of any
major financial assistance. Fourth, in some financial centres an uncertainty
regarding the conditions, timing and content of eventual assistance is promoted.
As a result, exact assistance practice is difficult to estimate. The uncertainty
relates to the notion of “constructive ambiguity” and constitutes a means to
prevent the development of moral hazard problems.
15
The following entity requiring attention is the actual grades received by the
bank exit regimes according to the FAI. On this point, the bank exit regimes of
New York, London, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Tokyo are analysed, respectively. –
When it comes to financial assistance to US banks, the legal provisions
concerning the assistance states that Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) funds constitute US financial assistance to (deposit) insured banks faced
with financial problems. Conditions for assistance are mainly dependent on FDIC
discretion. Main alternatives for the FDIC to handle bank failures comprise the
pay off of depositors or direct financial assistance to banks. In practice, assistance
is in the form of ordinary or subordinated debt. The FDIC has to choose those
alternatives that would minimise the loss for the FDIC. Only in case of systemic
implications, the FDIC may deviate from this restriction. From mid 1990’s,
depositors’ claims are in a priority in relation to ordinary creditors in the
realisation of bank assets. Moreover, subrogation of paid off depositors’ claims to
the FDIC will occur. Since the FDIC must minimise loss, the probability of such
financial assistance to banks that under these circumstances would benefit bank
creditors is very low. Considering US bank exit practice, small bank failures
without systemic implications has been dealt with in a legalistic and prompt
manner, implying losses for bank creditors. For larger bank failures, with eventual
systemic implications, the approach has been more liberal. Large banks have been
more probable in receiving financial assistance, also such assistance clearly
benefiting bank creditors. Still, the probability of financial assistance to large US
banks is seen as lower compared to other bank exit regimes. This derives from the
fact that the US bank exit regime is characterised by the concept of “constructive
ambiguity” and general reservations against governmental intervention. As a
result, the FAI of other than the largest US banks receives a grade of 3/15 while
the FAI of large US banks is 12/15.
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15 For literature on the subject of “constructive ambiguity” see Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and
Soussa, 2000, p. 74.
16 The latest rescue of a major US bank was the rescue of the Continental Illinois National Bank
and Trust Co. (CINB) in 1984. As a result of a run of uninsured depositors and implications of
systemic effects the government provided the CINB with a USD 2 billion assistance package.
Only bank shareholders suffered losses due to FDIC arrangements. On the other hand, smaller US
banks are seldom bailed out or dealt with in a way that would benefit bank creditors directly or
indirectly.19
The situation for UK banks is quite deviant to US banks. No legal base for
financial assistance to UK banks exists. Eventual financial assistance to UK banks
will most probably be lender of last resort (LLR) or other support from the Bank
of England (BoE) due to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into
by HM Treasury, the BoE and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 1997.
According to the MoU, assistance may be given normally only in the case of a
genuine threat to the financial system. The form of the assistance is not specified
in the MoU. This means that the assistance may take the form of loans,
subordinated loans or subsidies. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme
(FSCS, deposit insurance) may not assist banks directly. Focusing on former UK
assistance practice, the BoE has been fairly active in the handling of banking
crises before the establishment of the FSA. There has been examples of support to
smaller insolvent banks with eventual and denial of support to larger failed banks
without systemic implications (ie Barings). Consequently, the grades received by
other than the largest UK banks in terms of the FAI index correspond to 8–9/15.
For large UK banks the numbers given are 13/15. The relatively high scores also
reflect the establishment of the FSA, the recent introduction of the new Financial
Services Market Act (FSMA) and BoE ambitions in the area of financial
stability.
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When it comes to German banks, the role of the German Central Bank
(Bundesbank) as a source of assistance strongly differs from the UK BoE model.
In principle, ie in legal terms, the channels for a German bank to receive financial
assistance are two. The Liquidity Consortium Bank (LCB) handles the Central
Bank’s lender of last resort (LLR) function but may grant loans only to banks of
unquestioned soundness. The Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme administered
by the Association of German Banks may directly assist member-banks. The
assistance to member-banks may be in any form. The scheme is entitled to support
the member banks, but it has no obligation to assist the banks. Furthermore, the
funds of the scheme are limited. Though no other formal assistance procedures
exist, the actual role of the Bundesbank in a major crisis is not clear. Partly, this
depends on the capacity of the LCB. Analysing German bank exit practice, no
larger German banks have faced serious problems during the last decade. Still, the
situation may change. Bank problems have usually been dealt beforehand in a
manner accepted by the industry and the authorities. The extent to which German
insolvency laws apply to bank failures is unspecified. Accordingly, the probability
                                                
17 Analysing the most recent UK bank failures and government actions taken, these include
Barings Bank and Re Chancery plc. In the case of Barings Bank, the Bank of England (BoE) tried
to arrange for a rescue of the bank. The rescue failed, but the administrator was allowed to
negotiate an immediate contract with the Internationale Nederlanden Groep (ING) without
consulting bank creditors. No public capital was required in the arrangement. In 1991, the Re
Chancery plc. was reorganised on a voluntary basis. Similarly, no public capital was involved.20
of assistance in the case of a failure may be considered high. The FAI for German
banks is given a grade of 13/15 while the FAI for the largest German banks is
assumed to be 15/15.
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For Finnish banks, the bank exit rules include an existing statutory route for
state aid. The Government’s Guarantee Fund constitutes this statutory route. In
addition, the regime provides for a system of voluntary guarantee funds that may
assist member-banks. Capital collected by the voluntary funds may be used to
assist ailing banks. The voluntary funds may also borrow capital or receive
assistance from the Government’s Guarantee Fund. Banks may receive assistance
directly from the Government’s Guarantee Fund only in case the stable
functioning of financial markets is endangered (ie systemic implications).
Assistance from the voluntary funds or the Government’s fund may be in any
form. As a result of the banking crisis, the Finnish Parliament made a statement in
1993 to guarantee the functioning of the banking system in all situations. This
statement was revoked in 1998. Before 1998, the Bank of Finland (BoF) also had
the possibility to inject capital into insolvent banks in various forms. According to
the current legislation, this option does not exist anymore. The banking crisis in
the beginning of the 1990’s provided data on the assistance practice of Finnish
authorities. The concern for systemic implications of the failure of one bank was
apparent (ie Skopbank). Capital was injected into the bank and the banking
system as a whole, since the crisis was linked to a general recession deteriorating
the overall results and assets of the banks. Since the Finnish legislation
concerning the Government’s guarantee fund does not allow for direct assistance
to failed banks without systemic implications (and similar indications also have
been made by the Finnish Government), other Finnish banks than the largest ones
receive a FAI-grade of 12/15. The FAI for large Finnish banks is still considered
to be 15/15.
When it comes to bank exit rules applicable to Japanese banks, these rules
state that banks may receive financial aid from the Japanese Deposit Insurance
Corporation (DIC). The financial aid may be in any form. Until 1996 financial aid
to banks was only possible to facilitate mergers between a failing and a healthy
bank. From 1997 onwards, DIC was able to finance mergers between ailing banks
also. Initially, the amount of financial aid was limited to the potential pay off cost
to depositors. In 1996, the Japanese Government made a statement to protect all
deposits to their full amount. Accordingly, the limits for financial assistance to
banks were extended. These principles still apply. In addition, the Bank of Japan
                                                
18 Surprisingly, in 1974 the Bankhaus Herstatt was allowed to fail without governmental
intervention. Still, it is clear that the German assistance practice is supportive. The problems of the
banking industry are dealt with in near co-operation with the supervisory institutions. Recently
failed banks, ie Schmidt Bank and Bankgesellschaft Berlin in 2002, have received capital
injections.21
(BoJ) is in some cases entitled to provide assistance to insolvent banks, even
without sufficient security. Analysing Japanese bank exit practice, the role of the
BoJ has been more central than the laws indicate. In history the BoJ has organised
rescue operations involving public capital (DIC funds), BoJ funds and funds from
the private sector. The decision concerning the use of public funds is taken by the
Prime Minister’s Office. Since there is solid evidence of financial assistance to
Japanese banks, the FAI-grades received by the Japanese banks are fairly high.
Still, one should not forget that Japan faces a large public deficit eventually
restricting future supportive operations. Consequently, for the largest Japanese
banks the FAI-grade given is 14–15/15. For other than the largest banks the grade
is somewhat lower, ie 11–12/15. This is a result of the lack of systemic
implications in the case of smaller bank failures and the fact that the refinancing
of rescue operations may become a problem.
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Table 3.1 Financial centre grades according to the Financial
Assistance Index (FAI)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN
Probability of assistance to any bank (FAI)
N e w  Y o r k  r e g i m e 33333 3 . 0 / 1 5
London regime 8 8999 8 . 6 / 1 5
Frankfurt regime 13 13 13 13 13 13.0/15
Helsinki regime 15 12 12 12 12 12.6/15
Tokyo regime 12 12 12 11 11 11.6/15
Probability of assistance to largest banks (FAIL)
New York regime 12 12 12 12 12 12.0/15
London regime 13 13 13 13 13 13.0/15
Frankfurt regime 15 15 15 15 15 15.0/15
Helsinki regime 15 15 15 15 15 15.0/15
Tokyo regime 15 15 15 14 14 14.6/15
3.1.2 The Bank Creditor-Rights Index (BCRI) reflecting legal
creditor rights
The second index considered is the Bank Creditor-Rights Index (BCRI),
concentrating on certain basic creditor rights listed in the various bank exit rules.
Compared to the FAI which focused on the probability of financial assistance (ie
                                                
19 In Japan, there is a long history of bank bail-outs and other Bank of Japan (BoJ) led
arrangements in order to secure the continuance of banks’ activities as separate independent
entities or merged entities. An example of a larger bank recently receiving financial aid was the
Long Term Credit Bank. Also smaller banks have usually received support, though there are a few
examples of smaller banks being denied support.22
rules and practices for assistance), the BCRI only deals with legislative issues.
Since the rules are fairly stable over time, diachronic changes of the BCRI are
rare. On the other hand, major differences in the BCRI-grades exist between the
various financial centre bank exit regimes. More specifically, relating to the
format of the BCRI, the aspects taken into account are three. – First, the BCRI
concentrates on the existence of certain reorganisation provisions in the regimes
significant to bank creditors. The focus is on the formal reorganisation means
whereby creditor claims are cut in order to secure the continuance of bank
activities. Creditor-voting or/and court-approval constitutes conditions for the
cutting of creditor claims. The procedures have no effect on the position of
shareholders. – Second, the BCRI also deals with the judicial possibility for
creditors to start bankruptcy proceedings against banks. In other words, it looks
into the powers of the creditors, not the security that authorities may provide by
initiating compulsory liquidation. In practice, authorities in all financial centres
have the right to initiate compulsory liquidation on financial grounds. Whether
they do it or not is a question of a) them receiving adequate information about the
condition of banks, b) the type and exactness of existing insolvency criteria and c)
the will or obligation to act. What comes to creditor rights to initiate bankruptcy,
one would assume this to be a right of any creditor. Still, analysing the bank exit
regimes in the financial centres, this is not a feature of all the regimes. – Third, the
BCRI also takes into account whether creditors are subordinated depositors in the
realisation of bank assets. Depositor priority (US preference) significantly impairs
the position of ordinary creditors in the realisation.
20
The other topic relating to the BCRI is the grades received by the index for
the various financial centres. In this respect, the BCRI gives the aspects listed
above an equal weight. In other words, the aspects receive a grade of 0–5 and the
sum of the three grades received constitutes the BCRI-grade. – Starting with the
existence of certain reorganisation provisions, the US procedure for bank
reorganisation is given the value of 5. This derives from the fact that the US bank
exit regime does not recognise any reorganisation procedures that would cut
creditor claims without affecting shareholders. Reorganisation of US banks is
carried out through conservatorship (or receivership) and the powers given to the
conservator are considerable. Still, shareholder responsibility for the bank failure
is emphasised in all situations. – The procedures for the reorganisation of UK
banks assessed from the banks’ creditors’ perspective is given the grade of 0. This
implies that the UK jurisdiction comprises measures whereby creditor claims are
cut. Various bank stakeholders may initiate a court-directed reorganisation
procedure. Measures taken are subject to creditor/shareholder-voting or/and court
approval. In the UK, there is no specific reorganisation procedure for banks.
                                                
20 For viewpoints on all these legal features of the financial centre bank exit regimes see Granlund
2002.23
Procedures apply to all companies. – Reorganisation in accordance with German
laws is given the grade of 2.5. The grade reflects uncertainty whether
reorganisation provisions apply. The German Banking Act does not comprise
actual reorganisation measures. In principle, reorganisation is possible in
accordance with the Insolvency Act. The Insolvency Act provides for a procedure
through which creditor claims are cut. Still, the extent to which this act applies to
failed banks is not specified. The preceding insolvency acts (ie before 1998)
recognised two composition procedures based on creditor voting whereby creditor
claims were cut. – The possibility to reorganise Finnish banks has changed since
the beginning of the 1990’s. Seen from the creditors’ perspective, the current
situation may be numbered 0. The situation before 2002 is given a grade of 5. In
2002, the scope of the general Law concerning Reorganisation of Companies was
extended to cover banks. This resulted in the possibility that creditor claims were
cut in order to promote the re-development of the bank. In comparison with other
financial centres, the conditions for cutting claims are more stringent. Until the
end of 2001, no such reorganisation procedure for banks existed. – Japanese bank
reorganisation relative to bank creditors is marked 0. In theory, the Japanese
legislation provides for both a reorganisation scheme and a composition scheme
that may be used to cut creditors’ claims. Creditors vote on both schemes. Though
the Japanese banking sector has been characterised by several ailing banks, the
banks have been dealt with differently. Assisted mergers have constituted the
measure most frequently used.
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Concerning  the judicial possibility for bank creditors to start bankruptcy
proceedings, the US bank exit rules are given a grade of 0. The US bank exit
regime does not give creditors any rights to initiate the liquidation (ie
receivership) of a bank. Authorities make all the decisions. On the other hand, the
“Prompt Corrective Action” (PCA) scheme introduces a detailed procedure
focusing on capital adequacy that entitles/obliges authorities to initiate
compulsory liquidation. – The grade that the UK jurisdiction receives when
discussing creditor rights in the initiation of bank bankruptcy is numbered 5. On
this point, the fact that general laws apply to UK bank liquidation, opens up the
possibility for creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against banks as one
type of compulsory winding up. A bank’s inability to pay its debts is the judicial
criteria for the commencement of bankruptcy in the UK. In addition, courts may
wind up any bank if this is considered just and equitable. – In Germany, bank
creditors are not able to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against banks. As a result,
the German jurisdiction receives a grade of 0. The Banking Act states that the
only party entitled to initiate liquidation proceedings on insolvency grounds
                                                
21 The current trend in the formulation of bank exit regulation seems to be the replacement of
composition with broader authority-administered reorganisation. Both in Frankfurt and in Helsinki
such amendments have been made to the national legislation.24
against German banks is the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). There are
two types of insolvency criteria that may be used as financial grounds for
compulsory liquidation according to the German Banking Act, ie insolvency and
over-indebtedness. The terms are not further specified. – In case of the matter
discussed, the liquidation rules of the Finnish bank exit regime receive a grade of
5. In principle, creditors have been able to initiate bankruptcy proceedings for
Finnish banks also before the bank exit reform of 2002. In 2002, the legislation
more clearly set out creditor-initiated liquidation (ie bankruptcy) as an alternative
for the termination of bank activities. General bankruptcy procedures apply. The
main criteria for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against Finnish banks is
defined in the Bankruptcy Code as other than temporary inability to pay one’s
debts. Financial grounds for compulsory liquidation of banks are not included in
the Finnish 2002 legislation. On the other hand, insufficient capital adequacy
entitles the authorities to withdraw the banking license. This will result in the
liquidation of the bank. – The powers of Japanese bank creditors to initiate bank
bankruptcy in accordance with the Japanese bank exit regime receive a grade of 5.
Theoretically, bank creditors may initiate bankruptcy in accordance with the
general Japanese bankruptcy laws. Authorities received the right to initiate
compulsory liquidation proceedings in 1996. Criteria for the commencement of
bankruptcy comprise the debtor’s inability to pay his debts, suspension of debt
payments and debtor liabilities exceeding assets. In 1998, the “Prompt Corrective
Action” (PCA) scheme was established for Japanese banks. This scheme provided
for capital adequacy-oriented, objective criteria for action against banks. Though
formal bankruptcy and liquidation procedures exist, they are seldom used. Failing
banks (especially larger ones) have been dealt with through assisted mergers.
What comes to the subordination of ordinary creditor claims in relation to
depositor claims, the US bank exit rules receive a grade of 0. The number
indicates that the position of ordinary US bank creditors is weak on this point. In
the liquidation of US banks, ordinary creditor claims are subordinated in relation
to depositor claims. Similarly, depositor claims transferred to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a result of paying off depositors are in priority in
the realisation of bank assets. Before the amendments of the legislation in mid
1990’s, ordinary creditor claims were not subordinated relative to depositor
claims. – The bank exit regimes of all the other financial centres are given the
grade of 5. The grade signals that the position of ordinary bank creditors is strong.
Ordinary bank creditor claims are not subordinated in relation to depositor claims.25
Table 3.2 Financial centre grades according to the Bank-
Creditor Rights Index (BCRI)
1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN
New York regime, total 5 5 5 5 5/15
– elimination of claims 5 5 5 5
– initiation of bankruptcy 0 0 0 0
– subordination of claims 0 0 0 0
London regime, total 10 10 10 10 10/15
– elimination of claims 0 0 0 0
– initiation of bankruptcy 5 5 5 5
– subordination of claims 5 5 5 5
Frankfurt regime, total 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5/15
– elimination of claims 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
– initiation of bankruptcy 0 0 0 0
– subordination of claims 5 5 5 5
Tokyo regime, total 10 10 10 10 10/15
– elimination of claims 0 0 0 0
– initiation of bankruptcy 5 5 5 5
– subordination of claims 5 5 5 5
3.2 Identification and grading of features of the bank exit
regimes relevant to bank shareholders – the case of the
BSRI
Similarly to the previous section, the aim of this section (3.2) is to identify and
grade bank exit regimes. Still, some differences exist in relation to the previous
section. In this latter section, the perspective is on features significant to bank
shareholders. Consequently, features considered relate to shareholder security and
powers in the reorganisation and liquidation of banks. Deviant to the previous
section, the focus in this latter section is on bank exit rules only. The reason for
such an approach is the fact that the probability for financial assistance is the most
important area where bank exit practice deviates from bank exit rules and this area
has already been dealt with in the previous section. – The features of the bank exit
rules looked into comprise a) the existence of provisions that require that
shareholder-value will be cut if/when public funds are injected into the bank,
b)  the existence of provisions, resulting in an eventual elimination of creditor
claims without affecting shareholder position in the reorganisation of a bank and
c) the amount of discretionary powers given to the provisional administrator
during compulsory (ie authority-initiated) reorganisation. These features of the
law constitute the format of the Bank-Shareholder Rights Index (BSRI).
Regarding the grading of the BSRI, each feature of the law receives a grade26
between 0–5 in terms of its contribution to strengthen shareholder position. Since
all features of the law have the same weight in the index, the sum of the grades
corresponds to the grade of the index for the various financial centre bank exit
regimes. In order to grade the BSRI, the bank exit regimes are analysed below in
the following order, ie New York (USA), London (UK/EU), Frankfurt
(Germany/EU), Helsinki (Finland/EU) and Tokyo (Japan).
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Analysing the bank exit regime applicable to New York banks, the above-
mentioned features of the law are covered. To begin with, the US bank exit
regime does not comprise any separate provisions that would require that
shareholder value would be cut when public funds are injected into the bank. Still,
this fact is partly misleading. In the US, capital injections into problem banks
follow the legislation concerning FDIC activities. Pursuant to these regulations,
capital injections into problem banks may not be done in a way that would benefit
bank shareholders. Only, in extreme cases (ie in the case of systemic implications)
the authorities may deviate from the rules. Actual bank failures have also been
characterised by a dilution of shareholder investments. Consequently, the US bank
exit regime receives a grade of 0/5 on this point. – When it comes to the existence
of reorganisation provisions enabling an elimination of creditor claims without
affecting shareholder position, the US bank exit regime is also given a grade of
0/5. The US rules provide for no means through which bank creditor claims may
be cut without affecting shareholder position. Since shareholders are considered
responsible for the bank’s problems, they should be first to bear the bank’s losses.
– Finally, a few words may be said about the powers of the provisional
administrator during compulsory (ie authority-initiated) reorganisation. In case of
US conservatorship (or receivership), the powers that the bank exit regime
provide the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are considerable. US
bank exit provisions state that the FDIC shall succeed to all rights of bank
shareholders during reorganisation. The statement constitutes FDIC administering
and contractual powers. Administering powers comprise FDIC’s right to carry out
the activities of and represent the insured bank. Contractual powers reflect the
right for the FDIC to make agreements with (eg buy assets from) the bank. The
fact that US bank exit provisions (not only bank exit practice) recognises the right
for the FDIC to make direct agreements with (ie buy assets from) the ailing bank
                                                
22 Granlund 2002 constitutes the analysis of the financial centre bank exit legislation used as a base
for the following short presentations of shareholder rights.27
distinguishes US from many European rules. The legal feature in question is here
given a grade of 0/5.
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The position for London bank shareholders regarding the various features
of the bank exit regimes is quite deviating relative to the position of US bank
shareholders. Analysing the existence of provisions that require that shareholder
value should be cut when public funds are injected into the bank, no such
provisions are included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or
elsewhere in the UK jurisdiction. In practice, public funds injected into the bank
may be made conditional on whatever grounds. In accordance, this feature of the
bank exit regime is given the grade of 5/5 for the UK since no provisions exist. –
The following feature concerns the existence of provisions enabling creditor
claims to be cut during bank reorganisation. In addition, the cut should not affect
the position of bank shareholders. For the shareholders of a failed bank, such
reorganisation constitutes a valuable option. If the bank would be liquidated,
shareholders would loose their capital. When creditor claims are cut, bank
shareholders are given a second chance. The UK bank exit regime provides for
two procedures by which creditor claims may be cut without affecting shareholder
position. Both procedures are based on voting and court decision. Accordingly,
the UK bank exit rules are given a number of 5/5. – The last listed feature
included in the BSRI deals with the powers of the provisional administrator
during compulsory (ie authority-initiated) reorganisation. For the UK, the powers
of the provisional administrator receive the grade of 4/5. This corresponds with a
strong shareholder position. The UK jurisdiction does not comprise any bank-
specific reorganisation means. Bank reorganisation is only possible due to the
general reorganisation provisions in the insolvency and company laws. Though
the authorities may initiate certain reorganisation measures, the provisional
administrator appointed is bound by the decisions of the creditors’ meeting or/and
the court.
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The next financial centre bank exit regime to be specified and quantified
according to a shareholder perspective is the one of Frankfurt. On a general
level, the German bank exit regime is characterised by extensive shareholder
powers. Starting with the first feature of bank exit provisions analysed, Frankfurt
receives a number of 5/5. This is a result of the fact that in the German
jurisdiction there are no regulations that require that old shareholder value should
be cut if/when public funds are injected into the bank. Similarly, concerning the
                                                
23 Surprisingly, the US grade for the BSRI is 0/15. Accordingly, the position of US bank
shareholders in the reorganisation and liquidation of banks is weak. Former analyses made on the
implications of legal structures on corporate markets usually consider the US regime as a
benchmark, signalling extensive shareholder rights and powers. This is also the case in La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997 characterising the anti-director rights index as an
attribute of aggregated shareholder rights.
24 For an economic evaluation of UK insolvency procedures see Webb 1991.28
Voluntary Deposit Protection Scheme, there are no requirements as for bank
shareholders, when/if financial assistance is given to an ailing bank. – Other
aspects of the German bank exit regime of interest to bank shareholders relate to
the eventual elimination of creditor claims (without affecting shareholders) in the
reorganisation of banks. On this point, the German regulations receive a grade of
2.5/5. The German banking laws do not provide for any reorganisation measures,
whereby creditor claims would be cut. As in the UK, the German general
insolvency legislation comprises reorganisation procedures whereby creditor
claims are cut without affecting shareholder position. The procedures are based on
creditor voting and court decision. Still, there is uncertainty to what extent these
procedures apply to banks as specific types of debtors. The grade given expresses
a 50%/50% (uncertain) outcome. – As for the powers of the provisional
administrator during compulsory (ie authority-initiated) bank reorganisation, the
grade received by the German jurisdiction is 3/5. In other words, German bank
shareholders are fairly well protected during compulsory reorganisation. The
German banking legislation provides for a provisional administrator in charge of
the reorganisation of banks. Under certain conditions, the proper court appoints
necessary persons to manage and represent the bank, ie act as provisional
administrators. The powers of these persons are limited to the execution of the
measures necessary to avert insolvency proceedings and protect creditors. Only in
the case the appropriate governing bodies of the bank extend their powers, they
may exceed the limitation mentioned above.
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As for Helsinki bank shareholders, the Finnish legislation is characterised
by two existing channels to support banks. The voluntary guarantee fund system,
aiming to secure the stable activities of member banks was introduced in 1998.
Banks are not obliged to take part in the system, but membership enables them to
receive financial assistance also in the form subsidies. The second channel
comprises the Government’s Guarantee Fund. The fund is entitled to assist
individual banks (eg through subsidies) only in order to protect the stability of
financial markets. The Governments Guarantee Fund was introduced in early
1990’s. Regarding shareholder position under public financial assistance (ie
through the Government’s Guarantee Fund) the 2002 amendments of the Finnish
bank exit regime changed the situation drastically. In the banking crisis in the
beginning of the 1990’s large amounts of public funds were injected into the
Finnish banks. Part of the capital was in the form of subsidies, benefiting old
shareholders. As a result of the 2002 amendments, the current legislation requires
that old share capital will be used to cover old losses before assistance is given.
                                                
25 In addition, the German insolvency legislation directs creditor appointment of a trustee to
reorganise the bank as an alternative to liquidation. The trustee should present a plan for the
reorganisation of the bank to the creditors. Shareholders are not negatively affected by these
measures.29
Alternatively, banks may be nationalised by paying old shareholders in full.
Consequently, the current situation is numbered 0/5. The period before 2002 is
given a grade of 5/5. – The elimination of bank creditor claims, without
implications for bank-shareholders, is possible according to the Finnish
jurisdiction. Creditor voting and court decision directs these measures. On this
point the Finnish bank exit regime receives a grade of 5/5. Until the end of 2001,
no such measures existed for Finnish banks (0/5). – The last question concerns the
powers of the provisional administrator in compulsory (ie authority-initiated)
bank reorganisation. The grade received by Finnish law provisions is 4/5. The
Finnish banking legislation does not acknowledge any installation of provisional
administrators with significant powers to administer the bank’s affairs. This was
true for the former legislation (applicable until the end of 2001) also. Eg during an
eventual suspension of bank activities, only the bank (ie management/
shareholders) may present a plan for how to improve the bank’s situation.
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Shareholders of Tokyo banks have also been affected by recent amendments
to the legislation. Traditionally, the position of Japanese bank shareholders has
been fairly strong, but in late 1990’s measures taken weakened the position of
shareholders. Two aspects of the Japanese bank exit regime relate to the topic
whether shareholder-value is cut when public funds are injected into banks. First,
according to the main rule, subsidies to banks in order to arrange for mergers or
acquisitions do not negatively affect the shareholders of any of the banks
involved. In other words, subsidies do not automatically require the divestiture of
shareholder rights pursuant to the law. Second, the 1998 amendments of the
Japanese bank exit regime also provided for temporary nationalisation of failed
banks. This option clearly weakened the position of Japanese bank shareholders.
Authorities decided on the price payable to bank shareholders. Divestiture of old
shareholder rights occurred. To sum up, the regulations provide the Japanese
authorities with more than one alternative with varying implications for bank
shareholders. Still, since provisions that enable the divestiture of shareholder
rights exist, the grade received by the Japanese jurisdiction is 0/5. – Furthermore,
the Japanese jurisdiction comprises procedures aiming to secure the continuance
of bank activities by cutting bank creditor claims. The position of shareholders is
not weakened by the measures. The procedures are based on creditor/shareholder-
voting and court decision. Though the Japanese jurisdiction includes such means,
these types of bank reorganisation means have never been used. Still, the Japanese
bank exit regime is numbered (5/5). – By focusing on provisional administrator
powers granted by the Japanese banking regulations, the position of Japanese
                                                
26 From 2002 onwards, the legislation concerning compulsory (ie authority-initiated) bank
reorganisation, requires that an administrator will be appointed by the court to direct the
reorganisation and prepare decisions. Still, the independent powers of this administrator are not
significant.30
bank shareholders may also be estimated. On this point, Japanese law provisions
are given a grade of 3/5. In 1998, a reorganisation administrator scheme was
established to deal with failed banks or banks in danger of failing. The main
duties of the publicly appointed administrator comprised the operation and
management of assets of the bank. The powers of the administrator were limited
to those of the president of the bank. In other words, the administrator had to co-
operate with bank shareholders and creditors. Measures by the administrator
should be taken within one year of the appointment of the administrator.
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Table 3.3 Financial centre grades according to the Bank-
Shareholder Index (BSRI)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 MEAN
New York regime, total 0 0 0 0 0 0.0/15
– divestiture of rights 0 0 0 0 0
– elimination of creditor claims 0 0 0 0 0
– power of administrator 0 0 0 0 0
London regime, total 14 14 14 14 14 14.0/15
– divestiture of rights 5 5 5 5 5
– elimination of creditor claims 5 5 5 5 5
– power of administrator 4 4 4 4 4
Frankfurt regime, total 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5/15
– divestiture of rights 5 5 5 5 5
– elimination of creditor claims 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
– power of administrator 3 3 3 3 3
Helsinki regime, total 9 9 9 9 9 9.0/15
– divestiture of rights 5 5 5 5 0
– elimination of creditor claims 0 0 0 0 5
– power of administrator 4 4 4 4 4
Tokyo regime, total 8 8 8 8 8 8.0/15
– divestiture of rights 0 0 0 0 0
– elimination of creditor claims 5 5 5 5 5
– power of administrator 3 3 3 3 3
                                                
27 Earlier on, ie in 1996, the Deposit Insurance Corporation was also entitled to apply to the court
for the initiation of reorganisation in accordance with the general Japanese reorganisation laws. In
this case, the appointed provisional administrator did not have significant independent powers.31
4 Selection of market attributes, collection of data
and presentation of the results
4.1 Collecting data on attributes for prevailing market
conditions
4.1.1 Bank bond spreads as market attributes for bank creditor
interests
In order to evaluate the bank exit regimes specified and graded according to a
bank-creditor perspective, an analysis of the actual market conditions under the
regimes is called upon. The principles for such an analysis are presented below.
To sum up, one may distinguish between principles for the identification of
market attributes and principles for the collection of data. The actual market
conditions focused on constitute market attributes. In other words, market
attributes represent those features of the market that eventually are affected by the
bank exit regimes. Since bank exit provisions and practice relevant to bank
creditors are evaluated, chosen market attributes will also reflect creditor interests.
Overall, the data collected on market attributes is characterised by both a cross-
sectional and diachronic dimension. The cross-sectional dimension is generated
by the fact that the analysis covers market conditions in four financial centres
(New York/USA, London/UK/EU, Frankfurt/Germany/EU and Tokyo/
Japan). Below, principles for the analysis of market conditions are presented in
more detail by concentrating on the following sub-areas. These are a)  the
identification of market attributes, b) the structure of the data search, c)  the
collection of bank bond yield data and d) the collection of government bond yield
data.
28
What comes to the identification of market attributes, there are several
market attributes that both may be affected by the analysed features of the bank
exit regimes and also reflect bank creditor interests. These include credit
agreement terms, ratings carried out by third parties and even authority measures.
In the analysis, the market attribute chosen is the cost for capital provided by the
bank creditor. There are two main motives for choosing this attribute. The first
one is the fact that the attribute is a primary source of information. Creditors and
debtors agree on the cost of capital. Consequently, it may be considered as highly
                                                
28 In the forthcoming regressions the search is for correlation between features of the bank exit
regimes specified and graded relative to bank creditor interests (ie the Financial Assistance Index,
FAI and the Bank-Creditor Rights Index, BCRI) and the market attributes chosen. If correlation is
documented, it is probable that bank exit regimes affect market conditions to the extent
investigated.32
(empirically) valid. The second motive is that the cost of capital, in a causal
theory sense, should be relatively dependent of the features of the bank exit
regimes directing creditor security and powers. Since features of the bank exit
regimes direct creditor security and powers relative to credit agreements, they also
should affect the cost of creditor capital. – Other aspects of the market attribute
chosen concern the definition of the attribute. The cost of creditor capital may be
specified in three dimensions. First, creditor capital is considered to comprise
traditional foreign capital in the form of senior debt. Second, the cost of creditor
capital is reduced to a question concerning the spread of creditor capital. The
spread of creditor capital is defined as the difference between creditor capital
yields and the risk-free rate of return. The risk free-rate of return is considered to
correspond with the yield of government bonds in each financial centre. Third,
creditor capital considered, only include debt in the form of publicly issued and
notified securities (ie bonds). Moreover, collateral or pledges should not secure
the creditor capital in question.
29
The structure of the data search constitutes another important stage in the
empirical research process. The principal structure of the data search may be
analysed as a question concerning the type of data and source of data. As
mentioned above, the collection of data on market attributes for the evaluation of
bank exit regimes is characterised both by a cross-sectional and a diachronic
dimension. Consequently, there are two main types of data. The cross-sectional
dimension of the data derives from the comparative aim of the study. Evaluating
bank exit regimes in several financial centres implies that market conditions in
each of the financial centres are covered and compared. The cross-sectional data
represents market conditions in New York, London, Frankfurt and Tokyo.
Reliable spread data on Helsinki banks were not available. The diachronic
dimension of the data, creating a panel data set, is limited to the period 1999–
2002. During this period certain changes to the bank exit regimes have been made
in some of the financial centres. These amendments may (and should according to
the hypothesis of the study) have influenced the market conditions of that
financial centre. Also, the existence of a diachronic dimension in the data enables
the gathering of a larger data set dispersed over time. Concentrating on the
                                                
29 The argument for focusing on senior contrary to subordinated debt is the fact that senior debt
should be most sensitive to changes in the banks’ environment. In the realisation of the banks’
assets, senior debt-holders may regain all their capital or loose all or some of the capital. For
subordinated debt-holders this question is not as topical. It is rare that subordinated debt-holders
will receive anything in the realisation of debtor-assets. – The reason for concentrating on spreads
instead of yields eliminates a substantial amount of variation in the cost of capital and improves
conditions for the drawing of conclusions based on regressions results. – By considering debt in
the form of publicly traded bonds only, another type of sensitivity relating to market efficiency is
introduced. According to economic theory, publicly traded bond prices should signal the ultimate
knowledge (information) concerning the debtor and its environment.33
sources of the data used to describe market conditions in the study, these include
Bloomberg and Bankscope databases as well as Bankers magazine. To the extent
market conditions comprise bond yields the Bloomberg database has been used.
Other indicators on the condition of individual banks used were found in the
Bankscope database and the Bankers magazine.
Another important area in the analysis of actual market conditions is the
specific principles applied for the collection of bank bond yield data. Regarding
the definition of financial centre banks, the criteria for including banks in the
sample consists of the applicability of the bank exit regimes of the financial
centres on banks. In this sense, the domicile of the banks is central. Banks
analysed are commercially oriented, deposit-taking, retail banks in the form of
limited liability-companies. If bond yield data on such banks is not found for a
specific financial centre, other banks to which the identical bank exit regime apply
are included in the sample. Moreover, the judicial structure of the banks analysed
raises some questions. Banks may form independent entities or constitute
subsidiaries to bank holding companies. In the first case, creditor capital is
directly injected into the bank in the form of a separate judicial entity. If the bank
is confronted with problems, an eventual bank exit will have direct implications
on bank creditors. In the second case, creditor capital to the bank may be invested
through the bank holding company. Such an approach is frequent and may be
motivated on several grounds, eg fiscal grounds. The capital received by the bank
holding company may be transferred to the subsidiary bank in any form. In this
study, also the latter form of creditor capital is accepted as a market attribute. This
derives from the fact that an eventual exit of a bank subsidiary will reflect in the
value of the bank holding company. An eventual bank exit will have indirect
implications on bank holding company creditors of the same type as it would have
on bank creditors.
30 – The collection of bank bond yield data may be further
illuminated by focusing on certain characteristics of the bonds. Firstly, as
mentioned above, creditor capital should be in the form of senior, non-secured
debt issued and notified publicly. Secondly, some restrictions on the currency of
bonds apply. Bonds analysed are issued in the local currency of the financial
centre (ie USD, GBP, DEM/EUR and JPY). Thirdly, the maturity of all bonds
analysed is approximately three (3) years. It is assumed that such a maturity is
sufficiently long and such bank bond yields will comprise information concerning
the possibility of a bank exit. Yields of bonds with a very short maturity should
                                                
30 Another area requiring some additional enlightening is the role of international banking groups
in the study. International banking groups should not constitute a problem for the study in
question. This derives from the fact that all banks considered in the analysis are separate judicial
entities to which the local financial centre bank exit regime applies. In addition, in order to
eliminate any bias in bank refinancing costs generating from parent company jurisdictions, all
banks with an apparent foreign bank subsidiary-status have been excluded from the analysis.34
reflect the possibility of bank exit to a lesser degree. At least this is the fact when
banks analysed are relatively solvent.
Furthermore, the collection of bank bond yield data also involves the
measurement of bank bond yields. The panel data used in the study is based on
quarterly observations of bank bond yields during the period 1999 to 2002. In
more detail, observations start on 27.7.1999 and end on 27.4.2002 (ie 12
measurement points). The data on bank bond yields cover both large and other
than large banks, ie two separate groups. The original aim was to observe bank
bond yields for three large and three other banks (a total of six banks) at each
above-mentioned observation date. In practice, bond yield observations are fewer
as a result of data availability. For all cross-sections and the whole period
investigated the number of bond yield observations is 161. Of these observations
75 relate to large banks and 86 to other than large banks. – Regarding the banks,
these are divided into two groups, large banks and other banks. Large banks are
banks belonging to the top 3-group in each financial centre. Other banks are banks
picked on a random basis from the remaining group of banks in that financial
centre. During the period observed, a certain variation in the sample of banks may
be recognised. Variation concerning large banks is due to the fact that there may
be changes in the top 3-category. Since randomisation is repeatedly applied at
each quarterly observation date for other banks, variation according to other banks
will also occur. The number of banks (with bond yield observations) reaches 48.
The reason for separating large banks from other banks is that separate analyses
will be carried out for large banks. This is due to the fact that large banks may be
dealt with differently in the case of bank failure.
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Finally, a few viewpoints may be made on the collection of government
bond yield data. The question concerning government bond yield data in the
study may be divided into sub-questions concerning a) the character of
government bonds analysed, b) the principles applied for the observations and
c) the final definition of bank refinancing spreads as the difference between bank
bond yields and government bond yields. – As for the character of government
bonds analysed, bonds constitute publicly issued and notified government papers.
The bonds were issued by the governments in each financial centre and represent
the above-mentioned currencies. – Regarding principles for government bond
yield observations, government bonds are observed at the same quarterly
observation dates as bank bonds. In theory, the aim is to identify a government
bond of exactly the same maturity (approx. 3 years) as any bank bond observed.
Yields of government bonds are seen as expressions of the current risk-free rate of
return for the specific financial centres. As a result of the fact that the possibility
for identification of government bonds of exactly the same maturity as bank bonds
                                                
31 The criterion for the positioning into the top 3 category is the amount of total assets according to
the bank’s balance sheet. Balance sheet data are analysed on a yearly basis.35
Table 4.1 Bank bond spreads 1999–2002
1999 2000 2001 2002 1999–2002
All banks
New York Observations 7 15 18 10 50
Number of banks 7 11 10 6 18
Mean 92.61 113.27 113.57 91.27 105.22
SD (18.96) (24.67) (26.88) (11.01) (24.02)
London Observations 1 9 9 2 21
Number of banks 1 6 6 2 9
Mean 85.20 94.31 64.43 77.73 79.54
SD (NA) (20.18) (25.72) (0.09) (23.99)
Frankfurt Observations 5 15 19 9 48
Number of banks 4 8 12 8 13
Mean 26.53 33.01 35.84 34.53 33.64
SD (5.32) (7.86) (8.88) (10.69) (8.90)
Tokyo Observations 3 13 15 11 42
Number of banks 2 5 6 6 8
Mean 70.58 57.70 42.58 57.56 54.24
SD (54.72) (54.89) (31.76) (37.59) (39.88)
Large banks
New York Observations 1 5 11 6 23
Number of banks 1 2 3 3 3
Mean 70.85 103.66 95.52 89.52 92.59
SD (NA) (14.71) (10.51) (5.18) (12.56)
London Observations 0 3 3 0 6
Number of banks 0 1 2 0 2
Mean NA 77.11 47.07 NA 57.08
SD (NA) (NA) (5.19) (NA) (17.73)
Frankfurt Observations 3 7 7 3 20
Number of banks 2 3 3 2 3
Mean 30.30 39.98 44.30 33.22 37.99
SD (5.29) (3.84) (8.68) (3.03) (7.55)
Tokyo Observations 2 9 9 6 26
Number of banks 1 3 3 3 3
Mean 31.89 17.63 22.43 40.42 27.33
SD (NA) (2.16) (7.67) (26.03) (16.23)
Other banks
New York Observations 6 10 7 4 27
Number of banks 6 9 7 3 15
Mean 96.24 115.41 121.31 93.02 109.77
SD (17.91) (26.56) (28.54) (16.35) (25.68)
London Observations 1 6 6 2 15
Number of banks 1 5 4 2 7
Mean 85.20 97.75 73.10 77.73 85.15
SD (NA) (20.50) (28.14) (0.09) (22.44)
Frankfurt Observations 2 8 12 6 28
Number of banks 2 5 9 6 10
Mean 22.76 28.83 33.02 34.97 31.67
SD (0.47) (6.51) (7.35) (12.54) (8.91)
Tokyo Observations 1 4 6 5 16
Number of banks 1 2 3 3 5
Mean 109.27 117.80 62.72 74.70 84.13
SD (NA) (1.25) (35.29) (44.43) (37.05)36
is small, a model for estimation of hypothetical government bond yields for bonds
of exactly the same maturity as bank bonds is constructed. In the model, for each
bank bond observation, two government bond observations are made. First, a
government bond with a slightly shorter maturity than the bank bond is observed.
Second, a government bond with a maturity slightly exceeding the maturity of the
bank bond is observed. The hypothetical government bond is given a yield
according to these two observations (ie a weighed average), based on the
assumption that the yield curve is linear between the observations of different
maturity. – Consequently, the exact market attributes of this study, ie the bank
bond spreads may be defined more accurately. Bank bond spreads are bank bond
yields reduced by the risk free rate of return, calculated as a hypothetical
government bond yield with underlying assumptions concerning government bond
yield curve linearity.
32
4.1.2 Bank asset growth as a market indicator for bank shareholder
interests
When evaluating bank exit regimes relevant to bank shareholders, an analysis of
market conditions under the regimes is likewise required. As in the bank
creditors’ case, the analysis of market conditions comprises the identification of
market attributes and the collection of data. Similarly to the previous case, market
attributes constitute those features of the market that are affected by the bank exit
regimes and also reflect shareholder interests. In the analysis, data on all five
financial centres is included. To begin with, the selection of market attributes is
discussed below. Then, principles for the data collection are presented. Lastly, the
gathering of data on changes in banks’ total assets (bank growth) is looked into in
more detail.
33
As for the selection of market attributes, the alternatives to choose from
when searching for market attributes of bank shareholder interests are several.
Theoretically, market attributes representing shareholder interests may be based
on company results or status or reflect market assumptions. Another possibility is
that market attributes constitute combinations of these features. Profits, dividend
                                                
32 Sometimes, bank failures may be very costly to deal with. According to Milhaupt 1999 costs
may rise to 20–50% of the affected country’s GDP when bailing out troubled banks. In these
cases, also government bond yields may be affected by bank failures. Then, spreads as attributes
for individual bank condition are biased.
33 The econometric evaluation of bank exit regimes according to bank shareholder interests follows
the same principles as the evaluation of the regimes according to bank creditor interests. In the
regressions carried out below, the search is for correlation between features of the bank exit
regimes (identified and quantified according to a bank shareholder perspective) and selected
market attributes.37
yields, own funds, substance values, cash flows, total assets, share or market
values and growth potential etc. may be used as indicators on shareholder
position. The market attribute chosen in this study is the change in bank total
assets (bank growth). The main motives for this choice are the following. “Total
assets” is an empirically linked attribute without inductive influence. It is valid in
a positivistic sense in relation to the state of the bank. “Total assets” as a measure,
is fairly comprehensive in relation to shareholder interests. Moreover, data on
bank total assets is easily available and quantitatively exact. It is also continuos
and cumulative. Being more accurate, bank “total assets” is defined as the end
sum of the banks’ balance sheet. It is the total shown capital employed in the
banks’ business, including both foreign and own funds. There is especially one
characteristic of the market attribute that may receive further attention. As a
result of the attribute including foreign capital, the validity of the attribute in
relation to shareholders interests is conditional. An increase in total assets may be
due to an increase in foreign capital, decreasing the solvency and not affecting the
value of the bank. Still, there are a number of reasons for choosing “total assets”
as a market attribute in spite of this. In general, the development of banks’ total
assets does correlate with shareholder interests. Changes of bank solvency are also
restricted by the rules on capital adequacy. Since the risk for the shareholders is
limited to the capital inserted into the bank, a decrease in solvency is not
necessarily negative. Especially in financial centres characterised by bailouts,
excessive risk-taking may be appreciated by the shareholders.
34
Another aspect in the study of the effects of bank exit rules on bank growth
concerns the actual collection of data on bank growth. In this respect the
characteristics of this study may be analysed as similarities and differences in
relation to the previous (creditor) study. As mentioned above, one corresponding
feature is the fact that the two studies are characterised by both a cross-sectional
and diachronic dimension. The cross-sectional dimension in this study is wider
than in the previous study and includes the financial centres of New York,
London, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Tokyo. Helsinki was exluded from the previous
study, since reliable spread data was not found. In other words, the growth data
collected covers a sample of banks from all these financial centres. The diachronic
dimension of the data is also slightly different from the previous study. Focusing
on annual reports and balance sheet end sums of banks, the financial years
analysed comprise the years 1997–2001. The sources for data on bank total assets
consist of the Bankscope-database and Bankers magazine.
                                                
34 Alternative attributes for bank growth used in the literature also comprise changes in equity and
changes in the value of off-balance sheet business. Still, though these items may provide additional
knowledge on bank growth, they are not focused on due to the reasons listed above.38
Table 4.2 Changes in bank total assets 1998–2001
Number of
banks 1998 1999 2000 2001 1998–2001
All banks
New York 19 Mean 45.89 17.65 26.64 10.18 25.09
SD (48.25) (30.70) (75.30) (25.10) (49.77)
London 15 Mean 16.84 25.91 19.83 15.69 19.87
SD (29.31) (67.39) (9.08) (15.83) (37.83)
Frankfurt 15 Mean 55.41 6.89 8.62 0.47 17.80
SD (136.75) (18.38) (17.23) (8.59) (70.48)
Tokyo 17 Mean –4.81 –1.64 7.09 –9.79 –2.30
SD (6.50) (7.40) (18.55) (12.28) (14.58)
Helsinki 6 Mean 33.46 10.38 4.69 8.36 13.61
SD (42.59) (16.23) (18.57) (25.42) (27.19)
72
Large banks
New York 4 Mean 93.57 5.91 25.87 2.56 31.97
SD (62.76) (4.00) (35.55) (9.44) (49.95)
London 5 Mean 3.82 11.15 21.83 22.44 14.41
SD (9.54) (7.40) (7.98) (21.58) (13.71)
Frankfurt 4 Mean 18.40 19.02 28.10 0.01 17.47
SD (23.13) (23.41) (19.16) (4.11) (20.29)
Tokyo 6 Mean –2.67 –4.91 18.08 –1.38 2.47
SD (4.67) (5.61) (17.26) (9.11) (13.62)
Helsinki 3 Mean 34.34 6.78 –0.77 12.00 13.09
SD (60.20) (21.09) (20.83) (35.13) (35.07)
22
Other banks
New York 15 Mean 33.18 20.78 26.84 12.22 23.26
SD (36.42) (34.04) (83.78) (27.74) (49.99)
London 10 Mean 24.07 34.10 18.84 11.19 22.91
SD (34.44) (84.50) (9.83) (10.54) (46.11)
Frankfurt 11 Mean 71.86 2.04 0.83 0.63 17.93
SD (163.90) (14.62) (8.39) (9.86) (82.62)
Tokyo 11 Mean –7.49 1.63 2.09 –12.86 –4.52
SD (8.16) (8.06) (17.58) (12.15) (14.72)
Helsinki 3 Mean 32.15 13.97 10.14 2.90 14.24
SD (0.74) (13.22) (18.42) (4.11) (14.89)
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As for the detailed gathering of data on changes in banks’ total assets, a few
features may also receive further attention. To begin with, in the shareholders’
case,  the sample of banks is not the same as in the creditors’ case. The total
number of banks analysed here reaches 72. Of these banks, 22 are large banks
whereas 50 are other banks. All large banks that have belonged to the top 3-group
in any centre during the investigated period are included in the sample (under the
condition that data on changes in bank balance sheet end sums has been
available). Other banks are randomly chosen banks. The fact that failures of large
banks probably are dealt with in a deviating manner generates the distinction
between large and other banks. Differences in the probability for financial
assistance may namely affect bank growth (and bank risk level). Concerning the
judicial form of the banks, banks both in the form of independent or bank holding
companies are considered. The second type is accepted on the ground that a
change in the size of a bank subsidiary (ie an actual bank) will show up in the
total assets of its bank holding company. This should be true in most cases. –
Relating to the measurement of data, bank balance sheet end sums are collected
on a yearly basis for the period in question. In the measurement, effects of
inflation are not removed from bank balance sheet end sums. This derives from
the fact that these effects are considered marginal due to the short length of the
period. Bank balance sheet end sums are transformed to USD according to the
prevailing exchange rate at the end of the financial year in question. Bank growth
is defined as the yearly change in bank balance sheet end sums. The data on
changes in bank balance sheet end sums covers the period 1998–2001.
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4.2 The calculations and the results
The next stage in the research procedure, following a) the specification and
quantification of bank exit regimes and b) the identification of market attributes
and collection of data, is the actual calculations. In a sense, the presentation of the
calculations in this section (4.2) is fairly mechanical. Implications of the results of
the calculations on existing theoretical frameworks and previous empirical
findings concerning spreads and bank growth are discussed in chapter 5. Below,
the calculations are presented by distinguishing between three sub-areas. First, the
application and combination of indexes, as the starting point for the calculations,
are considered. Then, the actual calculations made are listed and discussed. Third,
the results of the calculations are presented.
                                                
35 In the collection of data on changes in bank balance sheet end sums, mergers, acquisitions or
divisions are not controlled for. In other words, the aim is not to exclude eventual implications of
bank exit regimes on merger etc behaviour.40
In the calculations, the indexes previously constructed are applied
independently and in combination (ie the Financial Assistance Index (FAI), the
Bank-Creditor Rights Index (BCRI) and the Bank-Shareholder Rights Index
(BSRI)).
36 Combinations of indexes are motivated by a number of reasons. There
are four types of reasons for combining the indexes in the calculations made, ie
reasons a) focusing on the relation between bank exit practice and law, b) relating
to the improvement of the identification of eventual determinants of market
conditions, c) linked to the sensitiveness of calculations and d) concentrating on
the applicability of the regressions. – Reasons focusing on the relation between
bank exit practice and law deal with the fact that combinations of practice/law
indexes are motivated on the ground that markets do not distinguish between these
items. Analysing market behaviour, features of the bank exit regimes should be
structured in a way relevant to market actors. – As for reasons relating to the
improvement of the identification of eventual determinants of market conditions
the perspective is slightly different. In this case, the combination of indexes is
motivated on the ground that it may give additional light on where to find new
determinants of existing market conditions. Such a revelation must not be
considered improbable, taken the complexity of factors that may affect eg bank
bond spreads. – Reasons linked to the sensitivity of calculations, deal with the fact
that indexes may be combined in a manner allowing for grade differences. By
giving the indexes various aggregated internal weights, conditions are created to
identify certain patterns in investigated market conditions and existing causal
relations. – Finally, combinations of indexes may also improve the applicability of
certain established calculation-techniques when searching for correlation between
features of the law and features of the market. A frequent problem in comparative
legal studies is that many legal indexes do not change over time (since
amendments of the laws are few) and the law is equal for all
individuals/companies in a given jurisdiction (ie country). Under such
circumstances, conditions for the application of advanced methods (eg regression
analyses) are not optimal, since no changes over time or cross-sections occur in
the search for correlation. By combining legal indexes with indexes reflecting
variation, the applicability of these methods is improved.
37
In the calculations indexes are applied and combined in the following
manner. Regarding calculations relating to bank creditors, these are first based
only on the Financial Assistance Index (FAI). This corresponds to the code FAI c
100. In these calculations, correlation between the probability of financial
                                                
36 For viewpoints on the structure and content of the indexes see sections 3.1–3.2.
37 Considering combinations of indexes, an alternative is always to restructure the indexes
themselves in order to improve their functionality. On the other hand, there may be reasons for not
doing so. Eg an interest in the distinction of pure legal features from authority practice may
motivate the existence of separate indexes.41
assistance to ailing banks in various financial centres and bank bond spreads for
banks in those centres is searched for. After the application of the pure FAI,
combinations of indexes are considered in the calculations. The indexes combined
are restricted to the Financial Assistance Index (FAI) and the Bank-Creditor
Rights Index (BCRI). These indexes are connected in two ways. To begin with,
the indexes are combined by giving both indexes equal weights. This combination
corresponds with the code FAI c 50. Then, the indexes are linked by giving the
FAI a weight of 25% and the BCRI a weight of 75%. In other words, in this latter
case, pure legal features of the bank exit regime (constituting the BCRI) are given
a larger weight than the probability for financial assistance to ailing banks. This
latter case is coded FAI c 25. The reasons for combining indexes in these specific
creditor calculations are several (compare the above-mentioned list). Still, the
main reasons are that such approach a) enlightens the relation between bank exit
practice (ie probability of financial assistance) and bank exit law provisions as
determinants of bank bond spreads and b) improves conditions for the application
of regression analyses. The second reason derives from the fact that FAI is
characterised by changes over time (ie the probability of financial assistance
varies) while diachronic changes in the BCRI are minor (no or few amendments
of the legislation).
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Calculations involving bank shareholders resemble creditor calculations to a
large extent. Calculations are based on the Financial Assistance Index (FAI)
independently and in combination with the Bank-Shareholder Rights Index
(BSRI). The BSRI focuses on pure legal features of the bank exit regimes
significant to bank shareholders. Regarding this approach, there is one aspect that
requires additional clarification. Namely, the Financial Assistance Index (FAI)
was originally created with bank creditor interests in mind. Though it focuses on
the overall probability of financial assistance to banks, it must at least in a critical
scientific sense mainly be seen as an indicator of such assistance that would
benefit bank creditors. In most cases, the assistance in question would be in
priority in relation to bank shareholder claims against the bank or even limit or
eliminate old shareholder-value when given. Still, the overall probability of
assistance may correlate with bank growth as a market attribute for bank
shareholder interests to some degree. As a result, in the shareholder-calculations,
the FAI has the same role as in the creditor-calculations. Depending on how the
two indexes are applied in the shareholder-calculations, one may distinguish
between the codes FAI s 100, FAI s 50 and FAI s 25. In FAI s 100, correlation
between the probability of financial assistance to ailing banks in various financial
                                                
38 In the calculations, the grades of the FAI applied to large banks is different to the grades of the
FAI applied to all banks (the grades of the BCRI are the same). Consequently these calculations
are coded FAI c L 100, FAI c L 50 and FAI c L 25.42
centres and the growth of banks in those centres is searched for. FAI s 50 and 25
also consider legal aspects significant to bank shareholders.
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The following topics to be addressed more closely relate to the actual
calculations. These topics concern the applied methods for the calculations, the
various categories of calculations made and viewpoints on control-variables. – As
for methods applied, regression techniques are used in the search for correlation
between the indexes (and the combinations of indexes) and the market attributes
(spreads in the creditor case and bank growth in the shareholder case). The
program used is E-Views. The relation between the exogenous and endogenous
variables is assumed to be linear. The regression is a least square regression based
on the standard OLS formula. – In total, there are six (6) groups of regressions
made. Of these groups, four (4) relate to creditor-calculations and two (2) to
shareholder-calculations. Groups of creditor-regressions may be further divided
into two entities. In the first entity, two groups of regressions are made, one
including spreads of all banks and another including spreads of only large banks.
The reason for separating large banks to an independent entity is the fact that the
probability of financial assistance is different (the FAI is graded differently) for
large banks. This is due to eventual systemic implications of large bank failure. In
both groups of regressions of this first entity, individual regressions according to
the scheme FAI c (L) 100, FAI c (L) 50 and FAI c (L) 25 are carried out. The
second entity of creditor regressions concentrates only on spreads of low-solvency
banks. The reason for such a focus is the assumption that in case of low solvency,
bank creditors should be more sensitive to whether they will experience a capital
loss or not. Consequently, issues like bank creditor security and rights should
become more central. In this second entity, a similar categorisation of groups of
regressions is made. First, spreads of all low-solvency banks are analysed. Then,
spreads of large low-solvency banks are looked into. In both groups of
regressions, individual regressions following the concept of FAI c (L) 100, FAI c
(L) 50 and FAI c (L) 25 are carried out.
40
The number of groups of shareholder-regressions is clearly lower, since only
two groups of shareholder-regressions are made. In the first group, the growth of
all banks is focused on. In the second group, the growth only of large banks is
investigated. The reason for the separation is the same as above. Large banks are
dealt with differently due to eventual systemic implications of large bank failure.
The concept for the individual regressions in the two groups is similar to that of
                                                
39 Similarly to creditor calculations, the grades of the FAI are different for large banks in
shareholder calculations (the grades of the BSRI are independent of bank size). The codes used for
these calculations are FAI s L 100, FAI s L 50 and FAI s L 25.
40 The criterion for the definition of a low-solvency bank is “less than mean solvency relative to all
banks of a particular financial centre during a particular year”. In other words, the group of low-
solvency banks varies over time, ie on a yearly basis.43
creditor-regressions. Individual regressions comprise FAI s (L) 100, FAI s (L) 50
and FAI s (L) 25 in both groups. – The last structural question relating to the
calculations is that of control-variables used. In creditor-regressions the level of
solvency and the size of banks are controlled for. The level of solvency is defined
as equity to total assets. Size is measured as the balance sheet end sum in billion
USD. The motive for controlling for solvency and size is the fact that these items
may, according to theoretical considerations, affect the level of spreads. In
shareholder-regressions the control-variables are the same as in creditor-
regressions. Still, the motives partly differ. In shareholder regressions, the interest
in solvency also enlightens the way that banks grow, given eg that the probability
of financial assistance correlates with the growth rate. The role of bank size as a
determinant of bank growth has also been a topic frequently considered in
theoretical discussions.
41
The final, and in many respects most important, topic is the results of the
calculations. The exact results of the regressions are listed in table 4.3 for both
creditor and shareholder regressions. Below, the results are presented in general
terms. – For creditor regressions, there are a number of conclusions that can be
drawn. To begin with, one may point out that the results of the regressions seem
reasonable. The results support the initial assumption that bank exit regimes affect
bank refinancing costs. The results are significant. The degree to which bank bond
spreads are explained by the exogenous variables exceeds 50 percent in most
cases. The relation between changes in the exogenous and endogenous variables
in quantitative terms is acceptable. Eg a one (ie 1/15) unit change in the level of
the FAI corresponds with a 7.20–24.43 unit change in spread basis points in
various regressions. Furthermore, the signs of the correlation coefficients are in
line with the theoretical considerations.
42
Other conclusions that can be drawn from the regression results are the
following. First, the probability of financial assistance (FAI) is more important
than the legal features (BCRI) of the bank exit regimes in explaining the level of
spreads for all banks and all low-solvency banks. This is not clearly the case for
large banks and large low solvency banks. Second, bank exit regimes seem to be
more important when explaining spreads of large banks than spreads of small
banks. Third, the probability of assistance (FAI) and bank creditor rights (BCRI)
seem to correlate negatively with the spreads. This is in line with initial
assumptions. Fourth, solvency as a control variable, does not explain the level of
                                                
41 Hameeteman and Scholtens 2000 and Wilson and Williams 2000 are examples of analyses
enlightening the relation between bank size and bank growth.
42 There is a small problem of serial correlation in the residuals since the Durbin-Watson statistic
is between 0.33 and 0.77. This may depend on the fairly low number of spread observations for
each quarter. It may also be a result of the fact that the underlying model is fairly static, though
spread movements are dynamic.44
spreads in general terms. Fifth, bank size as a control variable negatively
correlates with the level of spreads in all regressions. On the other hand, the
amount of correlation identified is marginal.
The results of shareholder-regressions are not of the same quality as the ones
of creditor regressions. The results are insignificant. While the explanatory levels
in the creditor regressions were above 50 percent in most cases, bank exit regimes
do not seem to explain bank growth. Still, in all regressions indexes and
combinations of indexes have some negative correlation with bank growth.
Higher probability of financial assistance (FAI) and improved bank-shareholder
rights (BSRI) link to slower growth. Also, the probability of financial assistance
(FAI) more strongly correlates with bank growth than do pure legal features of the
bank exit regimes (BSRI). Moreover, correlation is stronger for large banks than
for other banks. Finally, control variable results (both for solvency and size) are














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5 Theoretical implications of the results of the
analyses
5.1 Creditor-regression results in the light of theory and
previous empirical findings on credit spread
determinants
The existing theoretical framework on credit spread determinants currently
comprises determinants of a wide variety. Eg structural models of default, the
existence of embedded bond options in relation to interest rate volatility and the
implications of the interest rate term structure are features considered in the
theoretical discussions on credit spread determinants. In order to illuminate the
variety of factors hitherto considered in the theoretical discussions (and in
previous empirical studies), factors dealt with are analysed by distinguishing
between determinants relating to market dynamics, company-specific (ie bank-
specific) determinants and market structure-oriented determinants. Determinants
relating to market dynamics include the business cycle, the interest rate level,
interest rate volatility and the term structure of the yield curve. Company-specific
(ie bank-specific) credit spread determinants are in turn analysed by separating
between determinants relating to the leverage of the debtor-company and other
determinants relating to the value of the debtor-company. In principle, there is
also the possibility of a theoretical debate concerning the eventual differences
between bank spreads and other company spreads. Still, contributions in the area
of such a bank-specific credit spread debate have been few. Moreover, market
structure-oriented determinants are here considered a distinct group of market-
related determinants. The research on market structure-oriented determinants of
credit spreads is the area to which this legally focused study contributes. Previous
research done in the area in question is limited.
43
When it comes to credit spread determinants relating to market dynamics,
one of the most frequently discussed determinants is the general business cycle.
Implications of the business cycle on credit spreads are considered in the Quality
spread theory. The Quality spread theory focuses on the relation between
company and government bonds as features of separate sectors of the bond market
during varied economic times. Pursuant to this theory, earnings and cash flows of
debt providers are reduced during difficult economic times. This is also true for
debtor-companies. Asset values that form eventual collateral for debt issued are
likely to deteriorate. In this situation, rational investors demand an increasing risk-
                                                
43 For relating examples concerning the implications of the market structure on bank performance
see Chakravarty and Molyneux 1996, Allen and Rai 1996 and Dewenter and Hess 1998.47
premium to accept high-risk non-government (ie company) bonds. Conversely, in
a strong economic situation, earnings and cash flows of debt providers and
debtor-companies increase and asset values continue to grow. In this converse
situation, rational investors accept also risky non-government bonds. As the
demand of bonds increases, the risk-premiums provided by the debtor-companies
to debt providers decrease.
44 – Another determinant of credit spreads that
classifies as related to market dynamics is the interest rate level. Usually,
discussions concerning the interest rate level as a market-related bond spread
determinant have focused on the yield ratio. According to the Yield ratio (or
Relative yield) theory, it is not the difference between company and government
bond yields (ie spreads) that provides for the highest informative value. The Yield
ratio theory suggests that the ratio of non-government bond yields to government
bond yields will be more stable and more useful to observe than absolute yield
spreads. The underlying idea of the Yield ratio theory is quite contrary to that of
the Quality spread theory. The Yield ratio theory builds on the assumption that
times of high interest rate levels are characterised by wide spreads and times of
low levels by narrow spreads. In other words, the Yield ratio theory emphasises
proportionality to a very high extent. To assess the yield ratio theory, one has to
consider the role of spreads/yield ratios as a market attribute for each analysis
separately.
45
Closely related to the level of interest rates as a determinant of credit spreads
is  interest rate volatility. The effects of volatility on bond spreads may be
analysed in three dimensions. Firstly, interest rate volatility may have direct
effects on spreads by actualising embedded options in the debt contracts.
Regarding embedded options, many corporate bonds may have cash call,
refunding or put provisions. In combination with such terms, interest rate
volatility creates uncertainty concerning returns of existing bonds. Consequently,
investors require higher yields to compensate for the increased bond risks, leading
to a decrease in bond price. The effects of bond terms on bond yields and bond
prices vary depending on the specific character of the bond terms. Various bond
terms generate various conditions for debtor action. In some situations a
documented change in market conditions is needed eg in order to legitimate
optional measures by the debtor. In other situations, the legal terms may give the
debtor independent options without regard to market conditions. In these latter
situations, increasing volatility implies an even higher degree of uncertainty since
optional measures may be taken on whatever grounds. – Secondly, interest rate
volatility may relate to, ie cause changes in or derive from, the general business
                                                
44 Eg Fama and French 1989 discuss the relation between business conditions and expected returns
on bonds and find that credit spreads widen when economic conditions weaken.
45 For more detailed viewpoints on the yield ratio as an alternative market attribute see Dialynas
and Edington 1992.48
cycle, implying indirect effects on or correlation with spread movements. Changes
in interest rates impair the ability of companies to make investment decisions and
the consumers to consume. High interest rate volatility often precedes periods of
economic stagnation or contraction. During such times rational investors demand
an increasing risk-premium in order to accept corporate bonds as an alternative to
government bonds.
46 – Thirdly, when estimating the effects of interest rate
volatility on corporate bond spreads, the relative liquidity of bond markets should
be taken into account. Comparing corporate bond markets with government bond
markets, corporate bonds are usually less liquid than government bonds. In such
markets, the bid-ask spread is wider than in well-functioning markets.
Consequently, the variation in yields (and spreads) agreed upon is higher than in
well-functioning markets. This variation classifies as a specific type of market-
bound interest volatility.
47
The second group of theoretical spread determinants is the company-specific
(ie bank-specific) ones. As a result of the fact that the so-called structural models
of default for identifying determinants of credit spread changes concentrate on the
level of debt outstanding, company-specific determinants that relate to the level of
debt are analysed first. Later on, other determinants linked to the character of the
debtor-company are considered. – As for company-specific determinants focusing
on leverage, these may be viewed from two angles. In the first case, the view on
debt in relation to own funds follows a balance-sheet logic. Determinants deal
directly with the amount or proportion of debt in relation to own funds. Large
amounts of debt are considered problematic, since own funds may not be
sufficient to cover debts in the event of default. In order to cover for the risk that
investors bear in companies with large amounts of debt, investors demand a wider
spread. The second angle, from which determinants focusing on leverage may be
viewed, follows a profit/loss account logic. In this situation, it is not the amount
of debt in itself that affects the spreads – it is the cost generated by the debt as a
function of the amount of debt and the level of interest rates. According to this
perspective, the interest rate level in combination with the amount of debt is a
crucial determinant of the observed spreads. For a profitable company the spreads
may narrow, since cash flow is sufficient to cover for the interest paid and
                                                
46 Closely related to this question are considerations concerning local supply and demand shocks
as major determinants of the level of spreads. In some studies, this concept has been introduced as
a complementary explanation for existing spread levels, since other significant determinants have
not been identified.
47 Credit spreads of corporate bonds may also be affected by the term structure of the yield curve.
These viewpoints suggest that bond spreads are influenced by the shape of the yield curve,
independent of the general level of interest rates. Spreads are assumed to decrease when the yield
curve has a sharply positive slope and increase when the yield curve is flat or inverted. More often,
viewpoints on the term structure of the yield curve in relation to the level of credit spreads are seen
as expressions of the Quality spread theory. This is also the perspective in this analysis.49
decrease the amount of outstanding debt. Still, worth remembering is that a
simplified view on the amount of debt and the level of interest rates may be
misleading. The construction of spread determinants focusing on leverage also
actualises the maturity structure of company debt and future liquidity needs. In
other words, the spot (interest) rate is not necessarily a determinant of the costs
generated by the debt. For many companies the major part of existing debt is
fixed-rate and long-term. Such costs of debt are not affected by the spot (interest)
rate. Companies with unexpected capital outflows (ie liquidity needs) are the ones
most influenced by changes in the spot (interest) rate.
48
Other determinants linked to the character of the debtor-company include
determinants of a wide range. In the theoretical debate, these determinants mainly
relate to the value of the debtor-company and changes in the company’s business
climate. As for the case with company leverage, when estimating the potential
effects of these determinants on credit spreads one should consider the question of
transparency. In a theoretical, economic climate characterised by free, instant
information flow, disclosure of company data is not problematic. In the empirical
world, it is often problematic and may be crucial. – For determinants focusing on
the value of the debtor-company, the underlying theoretical assumptions are that
an increase in debtor-company value should generate lower spreads and a
decrease in value should reflect higher spreads. This derives from the fact that the
higher company-value constitutes a guarantee for the capital invested by
company-creditors. Still, the exact procedures for how changes in company-value
generate changes in credit spreads are not documented. – Another group of
determinants for credit spreads linked to the debtor-company are the ones
focusing on changes in the company’s business climate. Very often changes in the
company’s business climate are reflected in the value of the company.
Theoretically, improvements of the business climate are anticipated to generate
narrower spreads and deterioration of the business climate wider spreads.
49
Apart from these theoretical considerations, empirical research on bank bond
spreads has also turned the attention to other features with possible implications
on spreads. In these studies, aspects of the market structure, ie country specific
features, have been found to contribute when explaining the level of spreads. In
other words, signs of underlying systematic factors affecting the levels of spreads
have been identified in comparative studies but there has still been uncertainty to
                                                
48 Initially, Merton 1974 introduced the structural models of default. Since then, the empirical
validity of the models has been discussed. Eg Brown 2000 has found evidence supporting the
opposite view that credit spread changes are due to non-credit-risk factors.
49 Eg Bryis and de Varenne 1997 speak in favour of models focusing on firm value in the
estimation and explanation of credit spread levels. – The regression results of this study indicate
that other factors than firm value direct the level of spreads. Similarly, based on this analysis,
company size does not seem to affect the level of spreads very much.50
what these factors represent.
50 In principle, the character of country-specific and
market structure-oriented determinants has been seen as twofold in studies made
on bank performance. Determinants have been associated with the role of banks in
various financial systems but also directly with features of the regulatory system.
Traditionally, a distinction between relationship and transactional banks has been
made in the studies, signalling regional differences in the functions between
German-related and Anglo-Saxon banks. Furthermore, when focusing on
regulatory systems, the emphasis has been on investor protection provided by the
banking legislation. In this sense, this study clearly contributes to an area not yet
investigated. This study clearly indicates that certain features of the regulatory
system (ie bank exit regimes) direct the level of bank bond spreads.
51
5.2 Shareholder-regression results and existing views on
bank growth
In order to link the results of this analysis to a broader discussion on bank growth,
the current debate on determinants and types of bank growth is analysed below.
Bank growth, as a phenomenon, is not characterised by a large number of
scientific studies. Most frequently discussed bank growth determinants are market
growth speed, company size and company profitability. The market structure, ie
the roles of banks and implications of regulatory systems, has also been
considered to some extent in the studies made. Bank growth types primarily
comprise branching, product expansion and mergers & acquisitions. Overall,
conclusions drawn on the implications of various growth determinants on the type
of bank growth are few. Still, some results have been presented.
52
As mentioned above, regarding bank growth determinants, one potential
determinant is banking market growth speed. When estimating the implications of
banking market growth speed on individual bank growth, there are some aspects
that require closer examination. – One important feature when examining the
relation between banking market growth speed and bank growth is definitional. In
other words, it concerns the correlation between changes in banking market
growth and changes in bank growth. On both a theoretical and empirical level,
this correlation is seen as significant. Slowly growing banking markets correspond
                                                
50 Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 2001.
51 See Allen and Rai 1996, Dewenter and Hess 1998. See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Schleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998 and 1999.
52 Studies identifying determinants of bank growth include eg Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson
1997 and Hameeteman and Scholtens 2000. Rose 1987 considered the implications of the
regulatory system on the structure of the US banking system. Cyree, Wansley and Boehm 2000
have focused on various determinants of bank growth choice (ie types of bank growth).51
with slow individual bank growth and rapidly growing banking markets with
rapid individual bank growth. Still, there are a few factors stirring this simplified
scheme. Firstly, in slowly growing markets, banks are fairly apt to move to other
markets or close down. Secondly, rapidly growing markets are usually
characterised by newcomers in the form of newly established companies or
competitors from abroad. In addition, banks may merge or divide on various
grounds.
53 – Aiming to understand the relation between banking market growth
speed and bank growth, there is also a need to identify alternative sources of
market growth. Depending on the source of market growth, the conditions for
bank growth differ. The applied criterion for distinguishing between the sources is
the localisation of the initiative of market growth. To sum up, there are two types
of sources of market growth that are relevant when estimating the implications of
market growth on bank growth. The types of sources are market supply-oriented
and market demand-oriented sources. – Sources of market growth that classify as
market supply oriented are actions taken by the banks. Potential actions implying
market growth may be described by concentrating on three principal dimensions
in the relation between the bank and its customers. First, banks may provide for
bank and market growth by introducing new or further-developing old products.
In other words, banks focus on product characteristics in this particular case.
Second, product price discounts are another path that may lead to both bank and
market growth. Market growth will occur if the product in question conquers
markets of higher priced substitutes. Third, actions taken by the banks may also
relate to the information on products passed to bank customers. In principle, there
are two kinds of information, ie “pure” information and value-related (marketing)
signals. Such action may result in both bank and market growth. – The effects of
changes in market demand on bank growth have to be analysed separately for
decreases and increases in demand. In case of decreases of market demand the
conditions for bank growth are small. In this situation, the options for the
individual bank with ambitions to expand are either a) to conquer competitor
market shares or b) manipulate market demand. Since manipulating market
demand in times of decreasing demand is a costly activity, decreasing demand
will most certainly result in increasing competition between banks. In case of
increases in market demand, the individual bank is confronted with a new
alternative for expansion. As before, bank growth may derive from a) conquering
competitor market shares or b) manipulation of the market demand. The
conditions for the manipulation of market demand have improved. But moreover,
                                                
53 There are two reasons for presenting these viewpoints. First, banking market growth is a
conditional determinant of individual bank growth parallel to eg the regulatory system. Second,
these viewpoints are important if expanding the conclusions drawn in the regressions on individual
bank growth to a market level.52
bank growth may stem directly from c) the independent increase in demand, ie
from demand-lead market growth.
54
Another central determinant of bank growth dealt with in theoretical
discussions and empirical investigations is bank size. Bank size as a determinant
of bank growth may be considered in many ways. The approach chosen here is to
analyse the relation between bank size and bank growth from two separate angles.
Pursuant to the first angle, certain motives introduced in the theoretical debate for
dependency between the two items are further looked into. After that, according to
the second angle, “the Law of Proportionate Effect” (LPE) as an expression of
assumed randomness in growth is presented.
55 – As for certain theoretical motives
introduced for existing dependency between bank size and bank growth, these
focus on one dimension in the relationship. In this dimension, the interest is in
large banks. Large banks are anticipated to grow faster than average, ie faster than
small banks. In these theoretical discussions, the interest in small banks has
clearly been secondary. The first motive for assuming that a dependency between
large banks and a high growth rate exists is the thoughts on economies of scale.
According to this logic, large companies have an advantage since the level of their
expenditures is lower in relation to total assets compared with smaller companies.
This thought derives from the fact that expenditures are assumed to consist of
both a constant and relative part. Since the constant part of expenditures applies to
all companies independent of size, large companies will benefit. The following
motive for assuming that a dependency exists is the expected disposition of large
banks to acquire or merge with other banks. Looking into this feature more
deeply, it is difficult to find other theoretical arguments supporting these thoughts
than ideas on the variability of growth types for banks of different size. According
to these ideas, smaller banks are apt to grow by establishing new branches while
larger banks grow in alternative ways. The last motives sustaining the hypothesis
concerning the exceptional growth rate of large banks are large banks’ market
entry deterring activities and the existence of regulations manipulating the market.
As for market entry deterring activities these comprise any actions taken by the
banks or their representatives in order to hinder competition. By protecting
markets in total or in part, growth rates for already established companies are
secured. Usually, large banks are in a better position (having more advanced
devices for societal influence) to deter market entry than small banks. In many
countries, regulations may affect the growth possibilities for different-sized banks.
                                                
54 The figures on mean growth and variance in growth for the samples of individual banks in
various financial centres (table 4.2) illuminates the development of specific banking markets. Still,
as the samples comprise a limited number of individually picked banks and banks picked on
stochastic grounds, these figures can not be seen as attributes of overall market growth.
55 Relating to the measurement of bank size/growth, frequently used units are balance sheet end
sums, total equity and total on and off balance sheet items. – Originally, the Law of Proportionate
Effect was introduced by Gibrat in his work “Les Inequalites Economiques” Paris, 1931.53
Sometimes, different rules may apply to banks that fall short of or exceed certain
quantitative measures. These rules may strongly affect growth opportunities.
56
The following topic describing the relation between bank size and bank
growth concentrates on “the Law of Proportionate Effect” (LPE). The question
whether company growth is random or not has generated the law. This law deals
with the fact that company growth is stochastic and will create a certain market
structure of different-sized companies. In other words, the law is characterised by
a general assumption of company growth randomness. The informative value of
such an assumption may be analysed as follows. To begin with, the law comprises
a cross-sectional element. It states that growth should be independent of a-priori
classifications of companies. Growth randomness should apply to large and small
companies, companies in various industries, old and new companies, private and
public companies etc. Moreover, the assumption reflects the idea that also the
growth of a specific company should be stochastic over time. In this sense, the
law has a clear diachronic dimension. Another aspect of the law relates to the
operationalisation of the law in empirical research. To this extent studies usually
deal with mean growth and variability of growth for groups of companies or
individual companies. Also on this point, the randomness of growth implies
growth without patterns. In addition, the law implies that the outcome of a
stochastic growth process over time is a skewed distribution of companies of
different size. The skewed size distribution comprises a few large firms, rather
more medium-sized firms and a large “tail” of small firms. The law has received
attention since the theoretically predicted outcome of growth randomness (ie the
skewed distribution) corresponds with identifiable empirical data, ie current
market conditions. But still, in most studies, no clear evidence supporting or
rejecting the underlying assumptions on growth randomness has been found.
Though size itself seldom has explained growth, evidence of company growth
rates being related through time has been presented. Moreover, the question
whether the empirically identifiable concentration of banking markets is a result
of the law or other market features has not yet been answered.
57
When it comes to bank profitability as a determinant for bank growth, the
relation between the two items may be characterised as highly conditional. This
                                                
56 As for theoretical considerations concerning higher relative growth rates for large banks, such
considerations have seldom received unconditional empirical support. Molyneux, Gardener and
Altunbas 1996 and Berger, Demsetz and Strahan 1999 have presented evidence suggesting that
economies of scale are available to banks. Eg Rhoades and Yeats 1974, Tschoegl 1983 and Wilson
and Williams 2000 have not found any evidence linking large banks to higher relative growth
rates.
57 See Kumar 1985 and Hameeteman and Scholtens 2000 (on growth rates being related through
time) and Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson 1997 (on the law (LPE) as a determinant of market
concentration). – Analysing the results of the regressions made in this study, no evidence is found
that bank size would affect bank growth rates.54
stems from the fact that there are several reasons for why individual bank growth
is not a consequence of increased individual bank profitability. Reasons apply to
any individual bank and may also be used to explain the relationship between
profitability and growth of banking markets. – The first aspect to consider when
analysing the conditional character of the relation is the decisional quality of bank
growth. Though a bank may be profitable, this does not necessarily correspond
with growth since capital may be removed from the bank. Only in the case the
bank is directed to grow it will grow. Given this, the bank’s decision to grow is
affected by several types of features, eg shareholder needs and taxation. – One
such group of features affecting decisions on bank growth is the value-oriented
features. In this case, the focus is on decision-maker values. Analysing banking
markets over recent years, there is a clear trend in emphasising shareholder value
on behalf of bank growth in decision-making. This has not always been the case
in the financial centres investigated.
Furthermore, bank growth decisions are affected by the bank’s business
environment. If future growth possibilities are scarce, capital may be removed
from the bank by paying back debts or paying profits to shareholders. On the
other hand, if future bank profitability is assumed to be low, there may be a need
to secure future activities by preserving a sufficient amount of own funds. –
Another feature affecting decisions on bank growth relate to decision-maker
capacity. Decision-maker capacity may be analysed in two dimensions, ie by
concentrating on costs and risk. Bank shareholders with large deficits may require
high returns on invested bank capital restricting bank growth. Similarly, the risk
structure of bank owners may hinder bank engagements in certain areas. Bank
capital adequacy requirements also affect bank growth since expansion should be
partly covered by own funds. – Finally, taxation may initiate or direct ambitions
to expand. Profits reinvested in bank activities may be taxed differently compared
to capital paid back to bank stakeholders.
58
The role of the market structure on bank growth is an area that has received
some attention in the literature. Still, one has to conclude that this area has been in
the shadow of examining the effects of market structure on bank profitability.
Presumably, bank growth as a conditional attribute for bank success has
contributed to this situation. Analyses of the profitability of banks in various
financial systems (ie mainly German relationship banking vs Anglo-Saxon
transactional banking) and implications of various regulatory systems on bank
values classify as studies on the effects of market structures on bank
                                                
58 Considering empirical studies that link bank profitability to bank growth, most studies focus on
a)  the profitability of various-sized banks and b) the profitability of banks over time. – The
(insignificant) results of the regressions of this study signal that the solvency level of banks do not
explain the level of bank growth. Since profitability often correlates with solvency, regression
results indicate that profitability does not explain bank growth.55
profitability.
59 In studies directly considering the impact of the market structure on
bank growth, ie US studies, several features have been recognised to constitute the
market structure. Also here, the role of banks in the financial system, law
provisions as barriers of banking business or bank growth and governmental
agency decisions have been dealt with. In many cases, the studies have
documented significant effects of these variables on bank growth. Still, most of
these studies have been characterised by the absence of a solid theoretical
framework to build on.
60
Lastly, a number of points on the relation between various determinants of
bank growth and different types of growth may be made. Though no actual
theoretical contributions may be identified in this area, a few interesting empirical
results are found. Branching, mergers & acquisitions and product expansion
constitute growth alternatives. According to the results, larger banks and multi-
bank holding companies are most likely to grow through mergers & acquisitions
independent of the level of profitability. Regarding branching, there is some
evidence that profitable banks are more likely to branch than less profitable banks.
Moreover, banks in highly competitive markets are documented more likely to
grow through product expansion. Also, regulatory systems comprise restrictions
on various types of bank business, creating acceptable channels for bank growth.




Finally, a number of conclusions on financial centre competitiveness can be
drawn based on the results of the analyses. Regarding the evaluation of features of
the bank exit regimes relevant to bank creditors, the results of the analysis imply
that bank exit regimes affect bank refinancing costs. Banks receive a competitive
advantage in the form of lower spreads if situated in financial centres with
regimes providing bank creditors with higher grades of security and better rights
in the case of bank failure. Traditional determinants of spread levels usually
considered in theoretical discussions, in this case solvency and size, did either not
or marginally correlate with spread levels. Moreover, as for different features of
the bank exit regimes, the probability of financial assistance (here defined as the
                                                
59 See Dewenter and Hess 1998 and Allen and Rai 1996, respectively.
60 Eg Cyree, Wansley and Boehm 2000, Bhargava and Fraser 1998.
61 See Cheng, Gup and Wall 1989 and Cyree, Wansley and Boehm 2000. – This study provides no
significant evidence on a correlation between features of the bank exit regimes and the growth of
banks. In other words, the results are not consistent with conclusions drawn in previous articles on
the correlation between investor rights and the size of financial markets.56
FAIndex) was more successful than legal bank creditor rights (here defined as the
BCRIndex) in explaining the level of spreads for other than large banks. This was
not clearly the case for large banks. A separate question concerns the implications
of the fact that spread levels vary under different bank exit regimes. One could
assume that banks strive to compensate for the higher refinancing costs through
various arrangements. This is an area still to be investigated. – As for the second
analysis, ie the evaluation of bank exit regimes from a shareholder perspective,
the results of the analysis are not as good. Features of the bank exit regimes do not
explain  bank growth, since regression results are insignificant. Still, in all
shareholder-regressions there is some negative correlation between features of the
bank exit regimes and bank growth. Also in the regressions, the probability of
financial assistance (the FAIndex) more strongly correlates with the (absence of)
growth than do legal bank shareholder rights (the BSRIndex). Overall, the
correlation is stronger for large banks. Since results are insignificant, eventual
hypotheses concerning the effects of bank exit regimes on banking market
structures receive no support. No evidence on financial centre bank exit
legislation and practice affecting market structures is found.57
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